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Shaping Pensilon  Reform in Poland:
Security through Diversity
Agnieszka  Chlon, Marek Gora and Michal RutkowskiAbstract
All over  the  world,  pension systems have financing difficulties that  need to  be
addressed.  There are three ways of dealing with pension systems problems - finance it to a
greater extent from general revenues, rationalise the system, which produces savings in the
short run, or a full-fledged  reform, changing  the logic  and foundations  of the system.
After several years of political and professional  discussions,  Poland decided to follow
the latter path and introduced a new defined contribution mulitipillar system, consisting of a
public Notional  Defined Contribution, pay-as-you-go  first pillar, a funded private  second
pillar, and voluntary funded third pillar. The new framework covers only retirement savings,
while other  benefits still remain under  the  old defined-benefit  pay-as-you-go  regime. The
reform was launched on January 1, 1999. As of this date, the old defined  benefit pay-as-you-go
system was terminated for workers  younger than 50. The new old-age  system attempts to offer
actuarially fair benefits, potentially creating incentives to increase compliance and postpone
retirement. Minimum benefit provision for those who fall below the guaranteed level is co-
financed from general revenue.  Diversification  of retirement savings  provides greater security
to the members, as labour market developments that determine the notional rate of return in
the first pillar, and financial market developments that  determine the second pillar rate of
return are not perfectly correlated. This is why the reform package  has been named Security
through  Diversity.
This  paper  presents the  current  situation of the  pension system, the  struggle for
pension reform in the 1990s,  structure, the long-term outlook of the new pension system and
the main aspects of the system design as well as first experiences from the  implementation
process. Long-term projections show that the new system allows for greater financial stability
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4Shaping Pension Reform in Poland:
Security  through  Diversity
Agnieszka Chlon, Marek Gora and Michal Rutkowski
Introduction
All over the world, pension systems  have financing  difficulties  that must be addressed.
There are three ways of dealing  with pension  systems problems.  The most affluent  countries,
especially in the European Union, have tended to  opt for continued subsidies  to pensions
from general revenues. Countries that cannot afford large subsidies  have exercised  a second
option: trying to  rationalise their pension systems by seeking more revenues and reducing
spending. The third  option is fundamental reform, which is the  only way of achieving a
sustainable solution. But it  requires a coherent vision for the  design of the  new pension
system.
Following  the Chilean and other Latin-American  pension reforms, it is often asserted
that  fundamental reform implies replacing  a monopoly of a pay-as-you-go,  defined-benefit
system with a fully funded mandatory defined-contribution  system. From the perspective of
central and eastern European countries,  this reform option, despite  numerous advantages,  has
two  essential flaws. First,  it does not really diversify risks. A funded monopoly merely
replaces a pay-as-you-go  monopoly. Secondly, because of transition  costs, this  option  is
difficult to implement  in countries  with a sizeable  pay-as-you-go  system.
This is why Poland determined  that the pay-as-you-go  monopoly should be replaced
with a multipillar system. Future retirement savings  will be diversified.  Productivity growth
'Security  through  Diversity  team.  Agnieszka  Chlon  joined  Polish  pension  reform  team in January  1997  and was
Deputy Director  of the Office  for Pension  Reform  since  September  1998.  Marek G6ra was Director  of the
Office  for Pension  Reform  of the Polish  government  since  October  1997  until Office  termination  in April 1999
and was  previously  Deputy  Director  (October  1996  to September  1997).  Michal  Rutkowski  is Sector  Leader  for
Social  Protection  in Europe  and Central  Asia  Region  of the World  Bank  and former  Director  of the Office  for
Pension  Reform  of the Polish  Government  (October  1996  to September  1997).  We  would  like  to thank  Robert
Palacios  for insightful  comments  and the entire  Security  through  Diversity  team for their brilliant  work. The
views  and opinions  presented  in the paper  are  those  of the authors  and should  not be attributed  to the World
Bank,  or any  other  institution  or government.
5and capital market returns will play equally important roles through the pay-as-you-go  and
funded parts of the  system for providing old age pensions. The long run  objective of the
reform is to  have about  50 per  cent  (initially 62.5 per  cent) of the  mandatory  old-age
contribution going to  a pay-as-you-go  pillar, while the  other 50 per cent (initially 37.5 per
cent) being shifted to  a funded pillar. Since each of the  pillars has different types of risks
(Table 1), especially after retirement, the system's overall risk will be better diversified. Of
course, pay-as-you-go  and funding both  offer individuals a measure of certainty about their
future, but neither method can insure against common aggregate  shocks. One should not 'put
all the eggs in one basket'. 2 Finally, both pillars will operate in a defined-contribution-type
framework. The aim is a transparent system, with pension based on lifetime income, fully
adaptable  to changing circumstances.
Table 1. Risks  with different  types of pension  financing
Risk  Pay-as-you-go  Funded
Ageing population  Exposed  Not exposed
Unemployment  Exposed  Not exposed
Political bargaining  Exposed  Less exposed
Financial market  crisis  Not exposed  Less exposed
Inflation  Less exposed  Exposed
The Polish pension reform was launched in 1999. The implementation followed two
years of preparation, during which two sets of laws describing the new pension systems were
passed. The first  set of reform laws, including the  law  on  organisation and  operation of
pension funds (second pillar) and the law on Employee Pension Programs (part of a third
pillar), passed in August 1997. The second set of laws, including the law on Social Security
System and the law on the new pay-as-you-go  pensions from the Social  Security Fund, passed
in October and December 1998,  respectively.
The new multipillar pension system consists  of a notional defined-contribution, pay-as-
you-go  first pillar, a mandatory defined contribution, privately-managed,  funded second pillar,
and voluntary employee pension plans in the third pillar. The pension reform was launched
on January 1, 1999 with  changes to  the  PAYG pillar.  Open pension funds started their
operations  in April 1999,  although licensing  process  had begun in August 1998.
This paper looks at parts of the  reform specific to  Poland, but draws more general
conclusions.  We look at the motivation for reform, the struggle of reformers and politicians to
advance  the reform agenda, changes made to the initial reform proposal, the architecture of
the  new system, and issues arising during the transition.  The final section offers tentative
conclusions  and lessons  for other countries. 3
2 See,  for example,  Barr (1998),  chapter  9 and  James  (1998).
For an overview  of reforms  in other  transition  economies,  see  Rutkowski  (1998).
61.  Recent performance of the pension system4
The crisis of the Polish pension  system had much  in  common with  the  problems  in
other  countries'  pay-as-you-go defined-benefit  schemes, such  as a  worsening  demographic-
dependency ratio. But it was exacerbated by a particularly  inefficient set of special rules, some
typical  of  many  former  centrally  planned  economies  (such  as  low  retirement  age  and
widespread  sector  privileges)  and  other  specific  to  Poland  (such  as  generous  disability
provisions). Moreover, in the early 1980s  and later in the early 1990s, additional privileges and
special rules were added with little or no thought to the fiscal consequences.
As a result  of the  latter policies, the  average effective retirement  age dropped  to  57
years (55 for women  and 59 for men), compared to legal standard retirement age at the level of
60 for women  and  65 for men. Also in  the  1990s, the gap between  the system  dependency
ratio (measured as ratio of pensioners to  contributors)  and the demographic dependency  ratio
(measured as ratio  of people 65 +  to people  15-64) widened,  and projections  show  than this
tendency would continue in the future (Figure la).
It became difficult to  ensure the financial sustainability  of the Social Insurance Fund
(FUS). Consequently, the contribution  rate was raised rapidly  from 25 per cent in 1981 to 38
per cent during 1987-1989,  at finally to 45 per cent in 1990. This was made necessary by:
*  a decrease in the number of contributors  as a result of a decline in employment  (Figure 2b)
*  an increase in the number of new pensioners, especially in the early 90s (Figure 2c)
*  growth in the real value of pensions and  relative increase  compared to  the  average wage,
caused by wage-indexation until  1994 (Figure 2d)
The old-age benefit formula introduced  after 1991 offered replacement rates of 76 per
cent of the last salary. There was no reduction  in benefit for early retirement.  The formula for
the basic pension was:
P = 0.242W + (0.013T + 0.007N)B
Where:
P - monthly pension
X  - set at 0.91  in 1992  and gradually  increased  since 1993,  to 1.00  from January 1999
W - average,  gross,  economy-wide  monthly wage  in relevant quarter
T - total years of contributions
N - other eligible  years
B - individual  assessment  base
The old-age pension was split into three parts:
*  A flat component,  equal to 24 per cent of the reference wage, adjusted by a coefficient (k)
*  An earnings-related component, equal to  1.3 per cent of the applicant's assessment base for
each year of contributions  paid
4 This  paper  does  not discuss  nor cover  the farmer  pension  system  (KRUS).
7*  A  supplement  of  0.7  per  cent  of the  applicant's  assessment base for  each  year  of non-
contribution  during  the  career. Other  eligible years (e.g. bringing up  children,  university
education) may not  exceed one third of contribution  years.
The  individual  assessment  base equalled  average monthly  earnings  over  a period  as
indexed for  inflation.  In  1993, the  employee chose the  best three consecutive years from  the
last 12 years; each year  since, one  year was added  to  the  averaging period,  until  in  2000 it
reaches  10 years  from  the  last 20.  The  pay  in  a chosen  year  is compared  to  the  average,
economy-wide  wage for that year. The resulting  ratio, capped at 250 per cent, is multiplied  by
the indexed figure for  economy-wide  earnings, reduced with  X coefficient to derive the salary
base for the averaging process.
The  minimum  pension  was established  in  1991 at the level of 35 per  cent  of average
salary. Indexed as other  benefits since then,  in  1999 it stood at PLN 450.71, which  represented
33.4 per cent of average salary, net of social security  contributions.  Additionally,  a supplement
of 10 per cent of the average wage is payable from  age 75 onwards.
Expenditure  on  retirement  and disability  benefits'  grew, from  12.6 per cent of GDP to
15.4 per  cent by 1994 (Figure 2a). Pension  expenditures  in Poland  were higher than those  in
the  European  Union,  where  in  1996 social  security  expenditures  (old-age and  survivors)
amounted  to  12.3 per  cent  of GDP  (44.8 per  cent  of total  social protection  spending) 6. This
share  was different  across  member  countries  reflecting  differences in  the  social protection
systems, demographic  change and other social, institutional  and economic factors. The highest
expenditure  could be observed in Italy - 16.2 per  cent of GDP, and the lowest in Ireland - less
than  5 per  cent,  reflecting  the  demographic  situation  in the  countries.  The  former  has the
oldest, while the latter has the youngest population  in EU.
Expenditures  on old-age benefits are expected to increase, due to  the population  ageing
process,  experienced  in  most  of  the  EU  countries.  The  same situation  can be  observed  in
Poland.  Demographic  forecasts  show  a significant  increase in  the  ratio  of  older  people  to
working  age population  after 2010, as a result  of post-war  baby-boom cohorts,  with  a further
increase in the dependency  ratio  after 2040, caused by falling fertility  rates and the ageing of
the baby-boom generation  from  1980s.
In  the  1990s, more  than  50 per  cent  of social security expenditures  were  on  old-age
pensions.  In the absence  of reform,  projections  show  a small decline in  spending  on  old-age
pensions  until  2003 and  then  an  increase to  the  level of  8 per  cent  of  GDP  by  2020 and
stabilisation  at this  level  thereafter.  In the  same period,  expected contribution  revenues (at
current  rates) would  drop  to  4 per  cent of  GDP,  creating  annual deficit in  old-age pension
system  of 4 per  cent  of  GDP  (Figure lb).  The  same pattern  could be  observed  within  the
disability fund, where  projected expenditures  would  rise even earlier, due to earlier impact of
ageing population.  The  contribution  rate, needed  to  finance only  the  old-age system would
Including  both employees'  and farmers'  social  security  systems.  The employee  pension system  expenditures
peaked  at 13.12%  of GDP in 1994.
6 Eurostat  (1999)
8have to rise from the current 24 per cent to 42 per cent in 2050.  By this time, the number of
people above  retirement age would be double  the current level,  while the number of people in
working age would decrease  by one quarter.
Not surprisingly,  the crisis  of the Polish pension system became apparent not only to
social security  professionals,  but also to the public and politicians.
Figure  1. Polish  pension  system  in absence  of reforms
la.  Demographic  estimates  and projections,  1995-2050
0,9  System dependency  rate,
0,8  current retirement  age






..HHHHHHHHHHHHH_..._  dependency  rate
U(  C  (  N  n  v  e  N  C  e  0  q  N
5  0  0  0  - (N  `N  (  C  (  X 05  5 0  0  0  0  00  0  0  0  0>
(N  (N  CN  N  CN  C(  (N  N  (N  C(  (N  (
lb. PAYG old-age  system  expenditures  and revenues,  1999-2050
8%  ':  -
7%;







2003  2008  2013  2018  2023  2028  2033  2038  2043  2048
revenues  +  expenditures  '
Source: Office of the Government  Plenipotentiary  for Social Security Reform
9Figure  2. Recent  developments  in the Polish pension  system
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102.  The struggle for pension reform
The most contentious point  in the pension-reform debate among experts since 1989
was whether the system  should  remain a pay-as-you-go  monopoly.  Three groups emerged,
roughly  reflecting  the world-wide  division of opinion.  One group, the 'rationalisers',  argued
that the defined-benefit  pay-as-you-go  system should  be cut back, but remain in the same
form. A second group, the 'reformers', argued that the system should be fundamentally
changed:  reformed,  either  towards  a fully funded  system  or a multipillar  system.  But both of
these  groups,  until the early 1990s,  were overshadowed  by those  who believed  that short-term
preventive  measures  - such as  under-indexation  of benefits  - would be sufficient  (the 'non-
reformers').  However,  by 1992-93,  this last  group  was  on the verge  of extinction.
The rationalisers'  argument  was that a package  of reforms  to the pay-as-you-go  system
would stop the increase  in pension costs, particularly  under conditions  of high economic
growth. This package  would include consistent  price (or approximate  price) indexation  of
benefits, increasing  the  effective  retirement age from its low level and extending the
calculation  base  period. However,  even  with these reforms,  projections  show  that the system
would  be on the edge  of financial  sustainability.  A significant,  adverse  macroeconomic  change
would cause  serious disruption  or even a breakdown  of the system.  Moreover,  the system
would not be immune to the demographic  change  expected  after 2006.  There was a broad
agreement  - involving  both the rationalisers  and the reformers  - that these  reforms  should
be introduced  as quickly  as  possible.
However,  the reformers  argued rationalisation  alone  would be neither  sufficient  nor
desirable.  Social-insurance  reform  should,  they argued,  not simply  be associated  with cuts and
stringency,  but with new opportunities  for a generation  with many working  years before  it.
New horizons should show not only clouds of change,  but also rays of new opportunity,
which would make the reform more politically  acceptable.  They felt that rationalisation
would  not be desirable  because  the crisis  caused  by population  ageing  would  affect  any pension
system purely pay-as-you-go  financed, as it  is decidedly  more subject to  labour-market,
economic,  political  and demographic  pressures  than funded  systems.
Reformers argued for  a  social-insurance  system with new opportunities for  its
participants  and with a stabilising  mechanism,  to resist demographic  and macroeconomic
pressures.  In their minds,  this required  a move from defined  benefit  to a defined-contribution
system  and the introduction  of a funded component  in the pension  system.  The first, pay-as-
you-go  pillar of  the new system would be downsized  and made more transparent, by
introducing  a closer link between  individual  contributions  and individual  benefits.  In the
second  pillar, contributions  would  be invested  in an individual  account  to generate  a return.
Finally,  the existing  third pillar  for additional,  voluntary  savings  would  be developed.
The debate between rationalisers  and reformers  became quite heated after 1991.7
Initially, this had little impact on  politicians. However, an  increasingly  noisy debate,
combined  with growing difficulties  in paying pensions  put pressure  on decision-makers.
7  The  description  of the debate  is based  on Hausner  (1998).
11Backward-looking  wage  indexation of benefits meant that financial  pressure sharply increased
periodically. This was reflected, above all, in  the  inability to  prepare a budget without  a
dramatic choice between a huge rise in the budget deficit - undermining recently recovered
macroeconomic equilibrium and reversing  disinflationary trends - and major spending cuts
on important programmes. The successful  defence  of macroeconomic discipline by successive
ministers of finance meant there was no choice  in practice. It became  necessary  to under-index
benefits periodically. With the  help of so-called supplementary budget legislation, it was
technically possible to limit the expected rise in retirement and disability pensions.
In  1991, the revaluation act on pensions introduced several changes to  the pension
system. The most important ones included  withdrawal of special benefits  due to the work in
hazardous conditions, restoration of some link between earning history and level of benefit,
restrictions  of  possibilities of  combining working  with  pensions  (by  imposing  wage
limitations), caps on the individual assessment  base at the level of 250% of average  wage  and a
new  minimum  guarantee of  35%  of  average wage.  Most  changes  aimed  at  reducing
expenditures, but  those remained high  and in  1992 exceeded 13% of  GDP.  Additional
measures  were taken in 1992  by cutting the wage base used for calculating  benefits from 100%
to 91% of average  wage.
Pensioners and their representatives  opposed this policy. It became a major political
burden and partly accounts  for the sharp fall in support for the post-Solidarity government,
and its eventual collapse  in 1993.
The post-communist  opposition that won the elections promised, among other things,
a return to 'fair' benefits.  However, the new government faced  not only the same difficulties  as
before, but also some new ones. Public protests had been accompanied  by formal appeals  to
the  constitutional tribunal which  repeatedly ruled in  favour of those who  questioned the
amended regulations. The new parliamentary majority  could have formally  overruled the
verdicts of the tribunal. In most cases  it did not, feeling bound by its election promises. The
verdicts of the  tribunal came into  force and the  state's unpaid debts to  pensioners grew
rapidly, forming a significant  part of public-sector  debt.
The constitutional tribunal  consistently ruled  the  practice of  repeated temporary
suspension of the state's commitments to pensioners as unconstitutional. At the same  time, it
clearly stressed that  this  did not  preclude the  possibility of a permanent  change in  the
regulations, provided there was appropriate legislation. Thus, it was only  when legal and
political factors prevented ad hoc manipulation of the  pension system that  the warnings of
experts and the idea of major reform was taken seriously.
The coalition pact of the SLD-PSL  government, which assumed  office in the autumn of
1993, included  a very general  commitment to reform the social-insurance  system. The idea  was
to improve the existing system rather than change  it radically.  Therefore, the plan was geared
more towards protecting accrued rights than limiting them.
Only  in June 1994 was the idea of radical reform - introducing a new mandatory
funded  pension  - suggested, in  the  'Strategy for  Poland'  economic programme.  The
12government and parliament accepted  the strategy presented  by the deputy prime minister and
minister of finance (G. W. Kolodko 8).  As a result, in  1994 the  new law introduced price
indexation of benefits, simultaneously increasing the X coefficient in pension formula from
91% to 93%,  and then by 1% per year thereafter. Finally, the base reached  the level  of 100%  in
1999.
The heated  debate between the minister of finance (the 'reformer') and the minister of
labour (L. Miller - the 'non-reformer' turned 'rationaliser')  lasted a year and a half (from mid
1994 to the beginning of 1996).  It was mostly about their competing visions of reform. The
ministry of labour set out a plan for limited rationalisation  and reorganisation of the pay-as-
you-go system,  with a marginal role for the funded pillar. The plan consisted of
X  reducing  the growth rate of pensions  paid to the uniformed sector (police,  army, etc.), by
moving to the same  indexation rules applied to other employees
*  gradually  increasing  the contribution rate to the agricultural  system
*  introducing new rules for disability  qualification
*  gradually increasing  the retirement age
These proposals, adopted by the government in May 1995, were then submitted for
public consultation. However,  the minister of finance regarded them  as much too  timid.
Instead an alternative model was prepared, based on the  Chilean reform. It  envisaged the
replacement of the pay-as-you-go  system with a fully funded plan and the introduction of a
minimum state pension. However, this programme was never submitted to  government. It
was presented only with the intention of stimulating  a debate  that might produce alternatives
to  a  modified pay-as-you-go  system. It  largely achieved this  goal: public-opinion research
showed the ministry of labour's plan was perceived as conservative and that people expected
reform that would be more  decisive.  From the  initial plan, only  the  change to  disability
qualification  rules was implemented 9.
After the consultation process, the government recommended a revised programme
giving a greater role to the funded component in the autumn of 1995. This was submitted to
Parliament for debate at the end of 1995,  but the minister of finance remained opposed. The
debate took place  in April 1996,  by which time a new prime minister (W. Cimoszewicz)  and a
new minister of labour and social policy (A. Baczkowski)  were in office. The latter was also
appointed the first plenipotentiary for pension reform. He strongly supported fundamental
pension reform, and so announced in  parliament that the  government's  programme still
needed final 'touches'. In particular, he announced his intention to develop the idea of funded
pensions,  which had been included in the opposition's plans (Solidarity's proposed solution).
In 1996,  as a result of protests from pensioners, the indexation rules were made more
generous. According  to those rules,  the real growth of pensions  would be decided  annually in
See  Kolodko (1996).
According  to new  scheme,  disability  is granted  on the basis  of incapacity  to work, not health  loss as it was
before.
13the  state budget. The successful  passage of the bill through  parliament was helped by key
personnel changes at the ministry. Baczkowski  put a great deal of effort into getting this bill
passed  clearing  the way for fundamental reform by easing some of the tensions  concerning  the
pension system.
The change in the cabinet meant there were now reformers in both essential  posts of
labour and finance minister. They  began to  co-operate closely. Baczkowski  held a unique
position in the government because he had originally been a member of Solidarity. In 1992,
while still an activist,  he had been deputy minister of labour. He demonstrated  his negotiating
skill during the post-communist coalition (SLD-PSL)  government, and became chairman of
the tripartite commission  on socio-economic  affairs,  established  at the beginning  of 1994.
Quarrels in the governing coalition had caused some members of the SLD leadership,
including  the  prime  minister  to  establish a  dialogue  with  the  opposition.  Awarding
Baczkowski  a ministerial post was a good way of winning their trust. With the support of the
prime minister, the finance minister and the encouragement of the opposition, he began work
on a completely  new reform program. However, for political reasons, it was presented merely
as an update and an expansion of the previous proposal. The office for pension reform - a
team of experts assembled by  Baczkowski - prepared the  programme. The new pension
reform programme, Security  through  Diversity was published in February 1997,  three months
after the shocking, sudden death of Mr. Baczkowski.
Security  through  Diversity was wholeheartedly embraced by Baczkowski's  successors,
Jerzy Hausner (February-September  1997) and Ewa Lewicka, who took  over in November
1997 after the  return  to  power  of the  Solidarity-based coalition. Their sincere conviction
regarding pension reform and  their  professional and political efforts made it possible for
reform to proceed.  The legislative  process  that followed the Security  through  Diversity program
was also divided between the two governments.  The first set of laws included:
- Law of 28 August 1997  on organisation and operation of pension funds
- Law of 22 August 1997  in employee pension  programs
*  Law of 25 June 1997 on using privatisation proceeds to support pension reform
Parliamentary discussion on the above laws was fairly short, mostly due to  the fact,
that the laws created new elements in the pension system, and did not change any of the
existing rules. The laws gained  the support of the tripartite committee, which also allowed for
quick legislative  action in Parliament. Though the rest of the bills were not legislated,  the two
that were passed announced the date of the reform introduction as of January 1, 1999. The
reform calendar started in August 1998,  when the licensing  process for the new pension funds
started.  Everybody  also  agreed  that  privatisation  revenues should  be  used  to  finance
introduction of the funded component of the system".
The second set of laws included:
*  Law of 13 October 1998  on social security system
0 Such  a postulate  was  also  formulated  in an earlier  Solidarity  proposal.
14*  Law of 18 December  1998 on old-age and disability pensions from Social Security Fund
It  took  half a year to  formulate  the  draft  laws. During  this  period the  reform  team
focused  on  preparing  detailed  proposals,  including  re-drafting  the  old-age  and  disability
pensions law in order to unify existing regulations by including all the arrangements in the old
system".  This  was  also  a  time  of  political  consultations  both  within  governmental
departments  and  with  the  tripartite  committee.  The  latter  was  especially important.  As  a
result of those meetings several changes were introduced  to the initial proposal.
The most  significant change concerned  the retirement  age. The initial reform proposal
of equal minimum  retirement  age of 62 was controversial.  Some conservative politicians  and
trade unions were attached to a more traditional  view of women's  role in society and proposed
differential  pension  ages of  60 for  women  and  65 for  men  They  argued, that  already  the
effective retirement  age would  increase,  if current  rules remained  (60 for women  and  65 for
men),  due  to  the  withdrawal  of  the  early  retirement  privileges.  This  especially concerned
women,  who could retire  at the age of 55, after contributing  for at least 30 years. As a result,
the final drafts sent to  the Parliament  included  different  retirement  ages for men and women.
12 Despite several attempts, this was not  changed during parliamentary  debates
Another  change grandfathered  the  old  system  for  those  retiring  through  2006. This
regulation was a result of demands  fromn  trade unions,  not  to  withdraw  early privileges from
those  who  planned  to  retire  within  the next  few years" 3. Also, this  change was in  line with
Constitutional  tribunal  verdict  to  recognise  accrued  rights  for  early  retirement.  The
government  agreed that  a person  has  a  right  to  expect  his  or  her  retirement  rules  not  be
changed 8 years prior  to  retirement'4. This  regulation  was questioned  by trade unions,  who
demanded a longer transition.
The  first draft of the old-age  pensions  law included  only paragraphs  for the population  covered  by reformed
PAYG.  However,  this opportunity  was used  to unify the existing  regulations,  as well  as to introduce  several
rationalizing  changes,  regulating  existing  practices,  which  were  not specified  in the law.  Unification  also  helped
to shape  the same  solutions  for all covered  groups  (for instance,  the eligibility  criteria  for survivor  benefits
were  unified  for miners  and other occupations,  some  regulations  from decrees  were introduced  to the laws,
adjusting  legislation  to Constitutional  requirements).
12 However,  upon the introduction  of the reform,  women realised  that lower retirement  age  with actuarially
reduced  pensions  results  in significantly  lower pensions  at the age  of 60 compared  to age  65. In mid 1999  the
Plenipotentiary  started  working  on alternative  proposal,  allowing  women to retire at later age  with Labour
Code  protection  of the work  place,  forbidding  employers  to fire  from  work on basis  of age.
13 Most occupational  groups  enjoying early retirement  schemes  could retire up to 5 years prior to  legal
retirement  age.  However,  several  groups  had looser  criteria.  For example,  miners  could  retire  after 25  years  of
working  underground  regardless  the age,  teachers  after 30 years of working,  also without age limit, ballet
dancers  could  retire at 38.  Introduction  of a year  2006  rule  allows  all those groups  and three cohorts  of those
retiring  at 55  to draw  their pension  under old regulations.
4 Approximately  1/3 of required  tenure. It was  determined  as a minimum  vesting  period  for acquired  rights,
which  was in 1999  confirmed  by the Constitutional  tribunal, that overruled  a complaint  from the railway
workers  that the pension  reform  changed  their acquired  rights  to early  retirement.
15This part of the  legislative  package  was very  difficult, both  from the technical and
social point of view. Intensive consultations  led to  numerous modifications of proposals. On
the  grounds of lack of time to  formulate final opinion due to  constantly changing drafts,
OPZZ refused to present an opinion within tripartite committee. The final opinions of trade
unions were send directly to the Parliament. Both OPZZ and Solidarity expressed  negative
views on the changes in the PAYG old-age  system, especially  focusing on early retirement
issue.
The  government  decided to  continue the  legislative process, despite the  negative
opinion of the trade unions. One of the goals  was to have the general law enacted before the
scheme replacing early  retirement  was negotiated. The proposals were presented to  the
Parliament in April 1998.
Discussions  in Parliament were much longer than in the case of the first package.  This
was expected  for two main reasons:
*  The laws changed the functioning of current system and as such, were more difficult to
pass. Parliamentarians expressed their concern about the reduction of replacement rates
and intra-generational  redistribution in the PAYG system
*  The opposition objected to  the changes, by  extending discussions  in  the Parliamentary
Committee.  Because it  could  not  formally  object to  the  reform,  as  the  SLD-PSL
government  initiated the reform process,  this could potentially slow-down and, eventually,
postpone the reform
*  Trade union representatives in the Parliament continued to push for drafting solutions
replacing  early retirement before the laws were passed
Parliamentary  discussion led to  additional  changes in  the  law.  The  major  ones
included: changes in  the  notional accounts indexation from discretionary rule as annually
defined in state budget law to fixed 75%  growth of wage bill, change in the benefit indexation
rule from at least prices to at least prices plus 20 per cent of real average  growth, permission to
combine full disability benefit and earnings  in the labour market' 5, change in the coverage of
military forces  from everybody under age  30 to only new entrants.
The Parliament accepted the  laws by  the  end  of  1998 allowing the  reform to  be
launched in January 1999.
5  The  government  proposal  allowed  disabled  people  to work in labor-protected  companies.
163.  Description of the new pension system
3.1  FINANCING  AND  OPERATIONS
Under  the  new system,  old-age pension  benefits can be derived from  three  pillars" 6.
The first and  second pillars will be universal and  mandatory,  the  third  voluntary.  The first
will be pay-as-you-go financed, the second and third funded.  Contrary  to the old system, the
two mandatory  pillars will be based on the defined contribution  principle, where benefits are
linked to  accumulated  lifetime  contributions  and  earning  returns  based on  either  financial
returns or wage bill growth. Benefits also will be affected by changes in life expectancy at the
retirement  age. Figure  3 summarises the  differences in the  financing and functioning  of the
two mandatory  pillars of the new system.
The  fundamental  concept  underlying  the  reform  is  that  security  comes  from
diversification  of the sources of pension income,  hence 'security through  diversity'.  The first
and second pillars are linked to the labour and capital markets, respectively. The rate of return
in the first pillar  is linked to  the rate of growth  of the covered wage bill, in the  second and
third, the rate  of return  on investments.  There is some evidence that these are not  perfectly
correlated" 7. In  this  case the  system is more  stable. The long-term  target  is that  half of the
system will  be  funded  and  half pay-as-you-go. The  target  contribution  rate for  the  old-age
system was  18 per  cent of wage, net  of contributions.  Half  of this  is shifted to  the  second
pillar. The rest is paid to the pay-as-you-go  NDC  pillar. The first pillar contribution  would be
steadily reduced  until  reaching 9 per  cent.  This level of funding  was both  desirable  from  a
diversification point of view and affordable from the fiscal perspective. Greater funding  creates
a  short-term  cash-flow  deficit  in  the  first  pillar,  financed,  according  to  the  law,  from
privatisation  revenues.  On  the  other  hand,  participation  in  the  funded  pillar  reduces the
accumulation of implicit debt for the baby boom  cohorts, which helps to maintain  balance in
the pay-as-you-go pillar in the future.
The current  pay-as-you-go  system is closed for those born after 1948 and converted  to a
'Notional  Defined  Contribution'  system, forming the new first pillar.  All people  born  after
1968 are covered by both  pillars and those born between 1949 and  1968 have a right  to either
participate in both  pay-as-you-go and funded pillars or to  choose to  be in the new first pillar
only. Both pillars are mandatory for new entrants to the workforce.
Public  opinion  showed support  for  reform.  Some 73 per  cent of people  agreed that
pensions should  be closely related to contributions  and the length of time they were paid, and
68 per  cent  that  pensions should  be derived from  employee contributions,  capitalised  over
their working  life" 8.
16Disability and survivor pensions remain in the public pay-as-you-go  scheme.
17 jagannathan  and Kocherlakota (1996) cite evidence from the US. Palacios (1998) shows the correlation  between
annual wage growth  and equity returns to be close to zero for four OECD  countries.
18 Results of opinion  polls, conducted on the request of Government Plenipotentiary  for Social Security  Reform,
April 1997.
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3.2  THE CONTRIBUTION RATE
Under the old system, contributions of 45 per cent of earnings plus subsidies  from the
general budget (approx. 1.5 per  cent of  GDP) financed retirement, disability, and other
benefits,  such as work injury, occupational  diseases,  sickness  and family allowances.  Over half
of expenditures (about 24 percentage points of wage bill) were for retirement pensions. In the
new system, nine percentage points  of the contribution  are diverted to  mandatory funded
pensions. The individual's notional defined-contribution account will be credited with  15
percentage points of the contribution. The remaining 21 percentage points will finance other
pay-as-you-go  benefits' 9.
Until the end of 1998,  employers paid the entire 45 per cent contribution, based  on the
total wage bill in the companies. Under the new system, the contribution payment system
became more  complex. First,  the  contribution  was divided into  separate parts, reflecting
different  long-term and short-term risks and second, it was divided between the employee  and
employer. Starting from January 1999  each pays equally for old age and disability insurance,
work  injury  will be the  responsibility of  the  employer and  sickness of  the  employee.
Employees' earnings were grossed up  to  reflect their  new contribution,  so the  change is
neutral with regard to net wages and total labour costs The intention was to make financing
more transparent to employees.
After  the  reform,  the  total  contribution  rate  therefore  falls  to  36.59 per  cent
(45/(100+employee's  contribution)). Table 2 shows the structure of contributions to the new
system. Each part of the contribution will be allocated to separate funds within the social-
security fund (FUS). Each sub-fund will prepare its own actuarial forecast, improving the
transparency of the system and allowing for better management of all components of social
security.
9 These include disability, survivors,  work  injury and  sickness  benefits.  The paper  focuses only  on the old-age
part  of the  social security system. A  brief description  of the  rest of pay-as-you-go scheme  can be found  in the
Appendix.
18Table 2. Social-security  contribution  rates  as share of gross  wage
Contribution  Total  |  Emplo ee  Em  lo er
old age  19,52%  9,76%  9,76%
disabilit  &survivor  13,00%  6,50%  6,50%
sickness&maternity  2,45%  2,45%0/
work injury  0,4% to 8,12%  - 0,4% to  8,12%
The old  age contribution  is divided between the pay-as-you-go pillar (12,22%) and the
funded  pillar  (7,3%). The  contribution  is  collected centrally  and  transferred  by  the  Social
Security  Institution.  Contributions  are  registered  on  individual  accounts  in  both  pillars,
forming the base for future benefits. All contributions  are tax deductible and pensions paid are
taxed in both  pillars.
One aim of the reform is to cut 'the contribution  rate from  its current,  very  high level.
This  effect is achieved by increasing the effective retirement  age from  its current  level of 57
and  lowering  the  average  replacement  rate  by  introduction  of  notional  accounts,  which
reduces benefits  by  shifting the  longevity  risk  to  beneficiaries.  An  actuarially  fair benefit
formula increases incentives to postpone retirement  decision.
The  reform  introduces  an upper  limit  for  contributions  of  250 per  cent  of  average
earnings 20. Furthermore,  the  contributions  to  third  pillar  employee pension plans  are social
contribution  deductible, up to the level of 7% of individuals' earnings 21. The above changes are
expected to  have  little  impact  on  the  contribution  revenues.  Only  small  fraction  of the
population  earns  more than  250% of the  average wage and, with  existing cap in  the benefit
formula, most  of them did not report higher earnings to social security system. The 7 per cent
reduction  also  existed  in  the  previous  arrangement,  where  employers  could  deduct
contribution  to  group life insurance schemes up to  7 per cent of company average salary from
the wage bill reported  to ZUS. The total  effect of the above revenue losses should  not exceed
0.3% GDP annually.
The  social  security  system  covers  employed  and  self-employed.  Additional
contributions  are transferred  from the  state budget for periods  of  national military  service,
nursing disabled child and parental leave. The periods of unemployment  are covered from the
Labour Fund.  Those intergovernmental transfers are estimated to  run about 0.2 - 0.3 per cent
of GDP annually.
20 This corresponds  to the maximum  earnings  cap taken into account  in the old pension formula.
21 Because  there is no favorable  tax treatment in third pillar arrangement,  deducting contribution to employee
pension schemes  from social  security  contribution base  allows  employers  to establish  third pillar plans without
additional  labour cost.
1933.  THE FIRSTPILLAR
The accumulation  phase
12,22% of employee's  gross earnings, paid  by  both  employer  and  employee  will be
registered  in  the  individual's  notional  account.  These  contributions  will  then  be  indexed in
line with  75% of the quarterly  growth  of the covered  wage bill. Indexation  in  line with  the
wage bill, rather  than average wage growth  allows for better  stabilisation  of the pay-as-you-go
system, as the liabilities grow in line with  revenues, affected both  by the average wage growth
and growth  of labour forcer.  The sum of uprated  contributions,  'virtual'  or 'notional  capital'
will then form the basis for the individual's pension.
Indexation  in line  with  the  wage bill is designed to  give contributions  paid in  early
years  similar  weights  in  determining  the  overall  pension  value  as those  paid  just  before
retirement.  However,  because the  notional  interest  rate  is below the  growth  of the  covered
wage bill, the contribution  rate can be reduced in the  future, without  sacrificing the financial
stability  of  the  system.  Once  the  system  is  mature,  the  notional  rate  of  return  could  be
increased to  100 per cent wage bill growth.
The  benefits in many  pay-as-you-go systems  are related to  earnings  only  over a short
period 23. In the old Polish system,  earnings prior  to  1980 would  not  influence  the  individual
wage used for pension  calculation.  Earlier periods  would  only be reflected  in the  number  of
contribution  years accrued in  the  pension  formula.  The  result is redistribution  from  people
with longer  working  lives to  people working  for  a shorter  period,  and from  people with  flat
age-earnings  profiles  (generally  manual  workers)  to  people  with  steeper  earnings  paths
(generally professional and  managerial  workers).  The  new system ensures  that  contributions
count  throughout  the  working  life,  and  so  removes  an  undesirable  and  unintended
redistribution.
Each participant  annually,  by the end of March,  will receive information  about his or
her  virtual  capital account  balance. ZUS will provide  standardised  estimates  of the  pension
value under  different assumptions  of retirement  age 24.
Initial capital in the first pillar. People who  started  their working  life before 1999 have
initial capital'  added to their  accounts in recognition  of pension  rights accrued  under  the old
system. Initial capital will be calculated to deliver the same pension  benefit  as the  old formula
(adjusted for  age and  contributable  years),  as if everyone  retired  on  the  last day  of the old
system.  There  will  be no  differentiation  of initial  capital  between  those  who  participate  in
both pillars or in one pillar only 25.
22 See:  Valdes-Prieto (1999)
23 See Disney  and Whitehouse  (1999 - forthcoming)
24  Old-age benefit  estimates will be provided  after 2003, when  all contributors  will  have calculated their  initial
capital.
25 This was not the  case, for example in Hungary,  where acquired  rights were  reduced for those  who  decided to
switch to funded pillar.
20This approach to the  pension rights  recognition was mainly a result of the lack of
appropriate individual data. In the old pension system, the Social Security Institute received
individual information only upon retirement. Because  most of the individual records prior to
1980 were destroyed,  this method provided a way to deal with initial notional account  status.
Also, this allows  for the gradual reduction of replacement  rates in the pay-as-you-go  system, as
the initial capital portion of the notional account decreases  over time. Due to difficulties  in
finding appropriate records, the law sets a period of 5 years to calculate the initial capital for
all contributors in the new pension system.
The formula for the initial capital calculation is:
Initial Capital (C 0) = Po  * G 6,2,  where:
G 62 unisex  life  expectancy  at the age  of 62 in 1998  (209  months).
Po  old-age  benefit calculated  as of December  31, 1998,  with constant  element
adjusted  for work experience  and age  of a worker 26.
The G-value  used for the calculation uses one retirement age. If G-values  for 60 and 65
were used to calculate the initial capital, women with identical work  history would receive
30% higher initial capital. To avoid this, the G-value was set at the average  level of age 62.
That,  combined with  lower  retirement age for women would  create significant drop  in
pension value between women retiring  in  the  old  and new  systems in  2008 and  2009
respectively,  i.e. women lose from conversion.
In order to compensate  for this, the first five cohorts in the new system,  will receive
their pensions according to  another transition  rule. Namely, pensions granted in the years
2009-2013  will be calculated according to  mixed old-new pension formula. This formula
applies  to those women, who will not participate in the funded pillar.
Table 3. Weights  of old and new pension  in the mixed  formula
Year  Old  pension  New pension
2009  80%  20%
2010  70%  30%
2011  55%  45%
2012  35%  /  65%
2013  20%  80%
26 Constant element in the formula  is multiplied  by adjustment  factor  p equal to  min{  A-  ,18  where
Ai=individual's  age  at the end of 1998,  A, = retirement  age (60  for women and 65 for men),  C, years of
contributing at the end of 1998 (=Min((L+S);( 4/3 L)), Cr = required years of contributing (20  for women and
25  for men).
21The  initial capital calculation is  rather generous, because the  old  system  offered
significantly higher replacement rates than the new system. However, using current level of
life expectancy to calculate  initial capital (as opposed to projected life expectancies)  and lower
indexation of the accounts  allow for reduction of the implicit debt for the cohorts covered by
the reform, which results in additional reduction of replacement  rates in the new system.
Initial capital will count for more than 60 per cent of the benefit for the oldest cohorts
covered by  the  new  system, falling gradually for subsequent generations (Figure 4). The
impact will be smaller for younger cohorts, until it disappears for new entrants to the labor
market.
Figure  4. Share of initial capital  in pension  value, cohorts  1949-1974
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Note: Benefit share from contributions  from  1999 includes first and second pillars
Assumptions:
Average wage earners, starting career at the age of 25
40 years of working  career
Average wage growth:  4 %
Rate of return  from  funded pillar: 6%
Administrative  fee from contribution:  5%
Administrative  fee from assets: 0.6%
Annuity  company  fee: 6%
Rate of return  on annuity: 2%
22The benefit-distribution  phase
The system will have a minimum pension age  of 60 years for women and 65 years  for
men. The old-age  pension  is calculated  according  to the formula:
n  n
E,  Ci fI  (I  + rj  )
p  i=k  j-i  (  . *  where:
Pn old-age  pension  at age  n
c;  contribution  in year  i
rj  rate  of return  in year  j
k  age  of entering  to social  security
Gn average  life  expectancy  at retirement  age  in the calendar  year  of retirement
This formula adjusts  the level of benefit both to the value of contributions paid during
entire working career and life expectancy  at the retirement age.  The formula still redistributes
between men (living  shorter) and women (living  longer), by using the unisex life expectancy
tables.  However, it automatically  adjusts  for increasing  life expectancy  that is observed in the
Polish  population, increasing  the stability of the system.
Due to the actuarial  calculation of the benefit,  the new system has stronger incentives
to continue work after  the minimum retirement  age  than the does  old system.  Each additional
year of work and contributions will be rewarded  with a clear increase  in the net present value
of pension benefits,  as the accumulated  notional capital  increases  and life expectancy  decreases.
Benefits in  payment in the  first pillar will be indexed to  at least consumer prices
increased by  20% of real wage growth. Regulations,  however, allow for  more generous
uprating of pensions,  which stays at a discretion  of annual state budget  law.
Notional capital  is simply an account of rights and it cannot be liquidated at any point
in time. The accounts  of deceased  persons are terminated  and form an inheritance gain,  which
is used to increase  the revenues  of the pay-as-you-go  system 27.
Reserve policy in first pillar
The defined-contribution  system is notional in the sense  that funds are not built up: it
is still a pay-as-you-go  system. Thus, at any time it is dependent on the cohort of workers
paying  for the benefits  of the cohort of pensioners,  and so is vulnerable  both to economic  and
demographic shocks. While the former cannot be anticipated, the latter, to  a certain extent
can, and some measures  can be taken to  make the system less vulnerable to  demographic
27 This  is not the only  solution  possible.  For example,  in Sweden,  the notional  capital  of deceased  person  is
divided  between  survivors  and  registered  on their  individual  accounts
23changes. To  stabilise the  contribution  rate  in  the  system in  the  face of  demographic
fluctuations, reserves  will be set aside. Reserves will be built up when a large, 'baby-boom'
cohort is working, and drawn down when it retires.
The reserve  system is equivalent  to partial funding of the pensions' systems  first pillar.
The 'buffer fund' or so-called  demographic  reserve fund, will consist of any surplus in the first
pillar and one percentage  point of wage  bill (approx. 0.35 per cent of GDP) transferred to the
demographic reserve  fund in years 2002-2008.  The demographic reserve can be additionally
supplemented from privatisation revenues, if stated in separate legislation. Interest, and any
extra revenues,  will also be added to the fund. According to estimates, assets of the reserve
fund will reach 14  per cent of GDP by 2020 (Figure 5).
Figure  5. Demographic  reserve inflow  and  assets, 1999-2020  (% GDP)
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Source:  Social Budget Model,
Assumptions:  rate of return:  3.4 - 3.2%, no decline in contribution  rate
The aim of such reserve policy is to  ensure that the pension system is entirely self-
financing, will not  need  subsidies from the  general budget (aside from  those, that  are
purposely designed)  and that contribution rates could be steadily decreased in the future. The
demographic reserve  fund will be managed by the social insurance administration until 2002.
After this date, fund management  will be contracted out to private asset managers,  following a
tender procedure.  The law allows one asset  manager to manage  up to  15%  of total assets of the
demographic  reserve  fund. The investment  limitations are similar to those of the open pension
funds in the second pillar (see section 3.3). Additionally, the investment policy should by
guided by a 50 year forecast of revenues and expenditures of the pay-as-you-go  pension fund.
This requirement  was introduced to ensure an appropriate level of liquidity in the system. The
periods  of surpluses and  deficits in  the  pay-as-you-go system continue  for several years,
following  demographic developments. The  reserve accumulation and  investment  period
should follow  the projected needs of the pay-as-you-go  pension fund.
24A new role  for the social  insurance administration (ZUS)
The role of the social insurance administration also changed following the reform to
the pension system. Under the new system, the social insurance administration is responsible
for:
*  Managing  individual's  notional accounts
*  Calculating  and paying out first pillar pensions
a  Managing  old pension system for people born before 1948, calculating and paying out
pensions
*  Managing  other parts of social security system - disability, survivor, sickness, maternity,
work injury and other benefits
*  Collecting  all social security contributions 2"
*  Keeping  a database  of all contributors 29
*  Keeping  a database  of all employers and other contribution payers
*  Transferring  contributions to open pension funds
*  Supervising  the (contracted  out) management  of the demographic reserve  fund.
ZUS needs  substantial  restructuring to meet the challenge  of the new pension system.
By 1998 ZUS employed around 40,000 people in  its headquarters, 51 branches and
more than two hundred inspectorates. Each of the  branches had significant independence,
including  separate  Supervisory  Boards.  There  was  little  or  no  communication  between
branches".
Lack of qualified personnel also resulted in a weak  position  of ZUS in Labour  Court,
which almost always took side of beneficiaries 31.
The  social  security  system  law  changed  the  institutional  structure  of  ZUS.  As  of
January  1, 1999 the  institution  gained legal entity  status  and  was no longer  a part  of public
administration  system.  This  change  was  a  prerequisite  to  introducing  better  resource
management and proper  accounting principles 32.
One of the most important  changes was the creation of a more centralised management
structure.  The new  social security law abolished the  Supervisory  Boards in all ZUS branches
2B ZUS also collects health care contributions  and Labour Fund payments  from employers,
29 Also for the purpose  of health care system.
30 As a result, for example, there were cases when people would draw two  or more pensions.
31  For  instance, ZUS  lost  a case, when  plaintiff  suffered a work  injury  working  in one  place, simultaneously
receiving sickness benefit from  another  employer.  Though  ZUS argued,  that one should not  work  on sickness
leave, the Labour Court  ordered to pay both  sickness and work injury  benefit.
3  For  example, as a part  of public  administration,  ZUS was not  obliged  to account  for amortization  of fixed
assets,  which lowered  reported  costs.
25and introduced  one General  Supervisory Board that  consists of 15 people (5 representatives of:
government, employers and trade-unions and pensioners organisations).  The new Board was
established in April 1999. The responsibilities of the Board cover the following:
*  setting the rules of management  operations
*  assessment of the management  members
*  approving yearly financial reports  of ZUS
*  evaluation  of  annual  financial  plans  of  FUS  (social  insurance  fund)  and  demographic
reserve
*  evaluation of draft laws in the field of social security
*  assessment of the salary structure  of ZUS employees  (including management)
*  choice of the auditor
*  evaluation of the candidate for the President position
*  evaluation of ZUS statutes.
Introduction  of  the  individual  accounts  and  transfer  of contributions  to  the  second
pillar  required  the  design  of  a  new  IT  system  in  ZUS.  Earlier  attempts  to  introduce  the
individual  accounts were  altered,  in  order  to  fit  the  requirements  of the  reform.  The most
important  change led into  the  introduction  of a centralised  database to  be  able to  instantly
process the information  received. According  to the  law, ZUS has to  transfer  contribution  to
the  second  pillar  within  two  days from  receipt  of information  and  contributions  from  the
employers
The  decision to  leave collection  of the  funded  pillar  contributions  to  ZUS was made
for several reasons. The  most  important  was that  ZUS reports  better  collection  than  the tax
revenue  service in  Poland.  Both  systems required  significant changes to  allow for  monthly
information  registration,  and ZUS was already advanced in preparation  of a computer  system
that  could cope with  such  a task. The  Polish  government  also decided to  collect health  care
contribution  through  the  social insurance  administration,  which  lowers  the  overall  cost  of
social security  management  and  administration 34. In  the  future,  contribution  collection  and
benefit  payment  could be separated under two  independent  institutions,  which  would help to
divide  between  the  clearinghouse  role of ZUS  and  the  role  of pay-as-you-go social security
system manager.
One  of  the  most  important  implementation  issues  was  the  identification  of
contributors  and employers  in the  system,  as there  is no  unique social security  number  for
Polish citizens. At the moment  there  are two  databases for individuals and two for companies
operating  in Poland. It was decided, that ZUS will use those databases to identify  participants
in the social security system,  rather than introducing  a new identification number.  These are:
It is 5 days in 1999, 4 days in 2000, 3 days in 2001 and on two days from 2002.
;  See Demarco and Rofman  (1998) for discussion of contribution  collection and transfer.
26*  Personal  identification  number (PESEL)  for individuals
*  Tax identification  number (NIP) for individuals  and employers
*  REGON - enterprise  identification  for employers.
Because  all the systems include mistakes, ZUS IT system (KSI)  is designed  to use two
identification  keys for both databases.  Yet, the first months of implementation proved that
even using two  separate keys  does not  eliminate all  mistakes. Problems  with  proper
identification  of individuals  still occur.
Centralised collection and running individual accounts required solving such issues  as
registration of  individuals in  ZUS, registration of pension  fund  members, contribution
collection mechanism  and individual  accounts  identification.  Final solutions adopted for those
issues  and the elements of the IT system are presented  in the appendix.
3.4  THE SECOND  PILLAR
Nine percentage  points of salary net of contributions (7.3%  of gross  salary) is diverted
to a pension  fund chosen by the participant.
Each person can select  only one fund. There is a free choice between the funds: they
are not permitted to  refuse entry or restrict the right to  transfer to another  funds, either
directly or indirectly,  through the imposition of charges.
A  retiree will  be mandated to  buy  an annuity.  Annuities will be  provided by
specialised  annuity companies 35. The chosen option is similar to the one in Argentina, where
the contribution collection is centralised  and there is a link between the pension fund and the
managing  company.  Differences  occur in the disbursement  period, as in Polish system there is
a mandatory  annuitisation,  whereas  in Argentina participants can either buy an annuity or go
for the scheduled  withdrawal  option 36.
Regulation and supervision
Licences  are issued  to both  managing companies  and pension funds by the pension-
fund supervision  office (UNFE).  Pension fund managers  must meet a number of requirements:
*  a minimum  of Euro 4m paid-up  capital
*  requirements  for the probity of shareholders  and board members of managing companies
(for example,  they may not be convicted  criminals  or in arrears with tax or social security
payments)
*  shareholders  may not directly or indirectly hold stakes in more than one pension-fund
company
The annuity  law  was  not legislated  by mid-1999,  and  it is  possible  that the final  solution  will  be different.
See L. Thompson  (1999) and Rofman (1999)
27*  individuals holding influential positions in capital markets cannot serve as a director of a
fund or work for the supervisory agency
Any  changes to  the  fund  manager's shareholders,  board  members,  articles  of
association  or custodian must be reported immediately to the supervision  office.  Initially, each
company will be able to manage only one pension fund, except in the case of liquidation or
merger, when more than one fund may be operated for a transitional  period of a year.
The fund's articles of  association must  be submitted to  the  supervision office for
approval. Any proposed amendments must be published five months before introduction, and
again must be approved, except when a shorter period would be in the members' interest.
Pension  fund operations
Pension funds operate much as other open investment (mutual)  funds. Contributions
are converted into 'settlement units' (or a share of the fund) on a date of conversion, at least
four  times a month. This  generates a relatively smooth flow of assets into the  fund and
prevent monthly cycles in securities markets because of periodic demand from funds. (There
will be a substantial surplus of contributions over benefit withdrawals for at least 20 years.).
The settlement unit is valued daily and published in major newspapers.
The fund's value is assessed  primarily on the basis of market prices, according to rules
set by  regulating decree and the  supervision office. The  balance on  retirement  will be
calculated as the number of accumulated  shares (or settlement units) multiplied by the unit
value five days before the funds are withdrawn.
The  legal form  of  pension  funds. Pension  funds  are legal entities.  This  clarifies
ownership, and the rights and obligations of participants and managers. The alternative -
that the fund is commonly owned by the participants - would demand  major modification  of
the joint property  concept of the  civil code. Currently,  Polish law regulates trusts through
contract law, but this does not adequately cover the  relationship between beneficiaries  and
trustees. Having the fund as a single legal entity  ensures that the property  of the fund, the
participants and the pension-fund company are all kept separate.  It strengthens participants'
rights in the case  of insolvency of the managing company. Regulations  affecting  the managing
company should not affect  the fund's property.
Each fund is responsible for running individual accounts  for its member. This can be
performed either in-house or it can be contracted out. The decision depends on the pension
fund managers.  Most of the established  funds, decided to contract-out  this activity, to separate
transfer agents that will handle databases  of individual accounts  of pension fund members.
Portfolio decisions. The investments of the  pension funds are determined by each
managing company, within  investment limitations specified by decree by  the  Minister of
Finance. Assets must be bank deposits or publicly traded securities,  including securities  issued
or  guaranteed by  the  treasury  or  the  central  bank  (the National Bank  of  Poland) and
investment funds. Funds may also invest in non-traded bonds, but not derivatives,  except as a
means of limiting exchange-rate  risk in foreign investments.
28Pension funds are not allowed  to hold more than 5 per cent of assets  in the securities  of
one issuer,  except  for mutual funds, short-term bank deposits  and public-sector  securities.  This
is designed  to ensure a prudent level of diversification.  To avoid possible conflicts  of interest,
the  fund  may  not  be  invested in  securities issued by  a  pension-fund company or  its
shareholders, as well as their  controlled, controlling or associated  entities. Funds are not
allowed  to invest in real estate  or commodities.
Limits set out as to  where they can locate their investments include: 40% in quoted
stock, 5% in  foreign  securities, 10% in  the  secondary stock market,  10% in  National
Investment Funds (NFIs), 10% in National Bank of Poland papers and 15% in municipality
bonds, 10%  in close-ended  investment  funds, 15%  in open-ended  investment funds.
Starting on 1 January 2005, every pension company  will be able to operate two types
of fund. Type 'A'  will invest as above, while type  'B' will be restricted to  fixed-income
securities.  People approaching retirement age will then be able to  select a lower risk fund,
albeit at the cost of lower expected returns. An individual  cannot split his capital between 'A'
and 'B' funds.
Fee structure. A fund manager  is allowed  to charge  two types of fees:
3  a management  fee from the fund' assets,  that must not exceed  0.05 per cent of asset value
per month (0.6  per cent annually) and the fee must be defined  in the articles  of association.
Most of the funds in their articles  of association  decided  to charge  the maximum amount
3  defined  percentage  commission  deducted  from contributions  by the company,  which must
be the same level for all participants,  with reductions  permitted for contributors who stay
longer. In early 1999 those fees amount to  7 to  9 per cent of the contribution and are
usually  reduced to around 5 per cent after two years of participation in the fund. The law
does  not specify  a maximum value of this fee
Additionally, fund assets may only be used to finance some of the fund's operations,
such as capital  market activities and safekeeping  of assets,  including  the custody fees.  The goal
is a transparent fee structure, to allow members and potential  members  to compare costs. The
discount for long tenures in a fund is to discourage  transfers.
The real rate of return depends  on the length of participation  in the fund (Table  4). For
those who accumulate  in the pension fund for 10 years, fees  reduce  their actual rate of return
by almost 2 percentage  points, while actual returns of those who save for more than 30 years
is lower by approximately 1 percentage point. Taking this into account, people with shorter
accumulation  periods will not gain as much by switching  to the funded pillar.
29Table 4. Impact of fees on the real rate of return
Fees:
Administration fee on contributions  6.0%
Administration fee on assets  0.6%
Rate of interest  5.0%
Real rate of return vs. years of savin s:
10  years  3.22%
15 years  3.63%
20 years  3.83%
25 years  3.95%
30 years  4.03%
35 years  4.09%
Assumption:  flat  earnings  profile
Custody. The fund's assets must be held by a custodian or depository, selected  by the
fund and confirmed by the supervisory agency. The depository must be a bank with at least
Euro 100m of assets and no capital affiliation with the pension-fund  company. The national
securities depository is also allowed to play this role 37. The custodian is liable for damages
resulting from the pension  fund's failure to comply with legal requirements, and must inform
the supervisory agency of any  irregularity. This should guard against misappropriation of
pension-fund  assets,  with additional security provided by the assets  of the custodian.
Rate-of-return guarantee. Pension funds  are  subject to  a  relative  rate  of  return
guarantee, based on the average  return of all pension funds. At the end of each quarter, the
supervisory agency will calculate  the average  rate of return, weighted by size of fund, achieved
for the last 24 months by all pension funds in operation. Any fund management company
which fails to achieve  50  per cent or four percentage  points (whichever  is the lower) below the
average  nominal return for all funds will immediately  make additional payments to the fund.
These payments will be made in the first instance from a special  reserve of between one
and three per cent of total fund assets, depending on the size of the fund. These assets are
managed as an integral part of the fund. If the reserves are not sufficient,  the fund manager  is
obliged to  pay from its own assets. If the reserve and the  assets of the  fund-management
company do not  meet the shortfall in the return, then the  fund manager will be declared
bankrupt.
In the case of insolvency,  the guarantee  fund will make up the shortfall. The custodian
will take over management  of the assets  and participants will then be free to choose another
fund 38.
3  In practice,  however,  none  of the pension  fund  managers  chose  the national  depository  as custodian.
38 From  2005,  the returns  for  type 'A' and type 'B'  funds  will  be calculated  separately.
30The relative rate of return mechanism in the Polish system has been somewhat relaxed
compared to Latin American  pension funds, as the rate of return is calculated quarterly based
on rolling 24-month average  (compared to initial Chilean monthly calculation based on  12-
month  rolling  average 39).  However, it  is argued by  pension funds that  this  requirement
discourages  from investing  in stock market, which is volatile in short-run and may affect  the
rate of return guarantee.
Guarantee fund. A separate guarantee fund will be established. t will be managed by
the national securities depository. Guarantee fund assets come from pension funds payments
and returns from accumulated  assets.  The total value of the fund cannot exceed 0.1 per cent of
all pension funds net assets. A guarantee fund finances shortfalls in the  minimum rate of
return and other losses  of a pension fund assets  that cannot be attributed to the pension fund
manager. In the case  of the deficit in the guarantee  fund, state budget covers all its liabilities.
Disclosure. Pension fund  companies are  obliged to  inform both  participants and
UNFE  of their activities. Participants have the right to  a prospectus containing the fund's
articles of association  and the rights of fund participants (as defined by UNFE). They must
also be told of changes  in the prospectus  and the financial  results of the fund. Every 12 months
and on demand, the fund must give participants a statement of account showing the number
of units held and their total value.
Reporting to UNFE includes information about the state of assets and the results of
investment policy. UJNFE  can also demand other information related  to the fund's activity.
Pension-fund  assets  of married couples.  Accumulated pension assets constitute a part of
a married couple's common assets. In the case of divorce, the family and guardianship code
will specify the division of assets.  Assets will not be paid out, but transferred to the spouse's
account with the fund.
In case  of participant  death, half of the assets  will be transferred to the spouse's account
with  the  fund.  The other half will be paid as a  lump-sum to  beneficiaries specified by
participant, or to the family  members (spouse,  children, grand-children,  parents and siblings).
During the first 12 or so years after reform, a spouse who does not participate in any
fund will be entitled to participate in a divorced  or deceased  participant's pension fund, unless
he or she will have no right to participate in funds. In that case,  the inherited funds will be
paid as a lump-sum.
Transfers between funds. Transfers of all assets accumulated  in one fund to another
fund will take  place only on  the  last day of each quarter.  This  allows a clearing-house
mechanism for settlement  of transfers out of funds net of transfers into a fund, restricting the
need to  sell assets to  finance transfers. The clearing house will be the  national securities
depository, which already  acts in this capacity  for brokers.
If  a fund  member decides to  change the  fund  earlier than  24  months  after the
enrolment, he will be obliged  to pay a transfer fee to the fund he is leaving. The transfer fee
3  Currently  Chile is discussing a change to 36-month rolling average.
31depends on the number of months of the participation in fund and amounts from 40 per cent
to 5 per cent of the minimum wage.
Taxation. Contributions are tax deductible, as in the first pillar. The fund's investment
earnings are tax exempt. The profits of the pension-fund company are taxed Assets  transferred
to claim pension  benefits on retirement are not taxed. Only when participants begin  to receive
their pension will they begin to pay personal income tax on the  benefits on a current basis.
Thus, the second pillar has an expenditure-tax  or EET (exempt-exempt-taxed)  treatment.
Following  the death of a participant, assets  transferred to the spouse's  account  in a fund
will be exempt from tax. These assets  will be taxed when the spouse begins to collect  benefits.
In all other cases,  such as payments to other beneficiaries,  including close  family members, the
assets will be subject  to an inheritance tax at 20 per cent rate.
Funded  pension benefits
According  to the draft proposal, being sent to the Parliament, members  must purchase
an annuity from an insurance company when they retire (defined as the time they draw their
first-pillar pension). Only licensed insurance companies will be allowed to participate. This
market, too, will be regulated  strictly, because  pension assets  will accumulate  tax-free  and the
public sector will guarantee the benefits through an insurance guarantee fund (along  the lines
of  the  pension benefit guarantee corporation  in  the  United States), that  will ensure full
payment of benefits in the  event of an insurance company's bankruptcy, underwritten by
treasury guarantee. The plan at time of writing is to  require a licensed annuity company to
meet the following  conditions:
*  fully paid-up  share capital of at least Euro 25m required to  obtain a licence (which can be
increased as the  discretion of  the  council  of  ministers depending on  the  insurance
company's commitments
*  insurance  companies  offering annuities would not be able  to sell other types of insurance
*  annuity-company licences will not  be issued until  one year before the first participants
reach the  minimum retirement age (around 11 years after  the  implementation of the
reform)
*  in addition to  prudential norms defined in the Insurance Act, the council of ministers
should be able to introduce investment limits for insurers
*  the  state insurance supervision office (PLNI)  would be  able to  monitor  insurance
companies'  reserves  and order capital increases  and restrict investments as it sees  fit
To  protect  the  pension's purchasing power,  benefits must  be indexed at least to
consumer  prices, although  indexation increases up  to  average wages growth  would  be
permitted.
The annuity  rate  offered can  vary  only  with  the  age of  the  purchaser. Annuity
companies will be obliged to use the same life expectancy  tables, not varied by gender,  health
or region. Companies  cannot refuse  to provide an annuity. All companies  would have  to offer
a set of standard pension benefits as follows:
32*  single life annuities, paid until the death of the annuitant
*  guaranteed (or survivorship) annuity,  where  benefits will be paid out for at least ten years,
to the annuitant's  survivors in the case of death during that period
*  joint annuity,  paid until the death  of the second spouse, with survivors' pensions at least 75
per cent of the original annuity
*  joint,  guaranteed  (or survivorship)  annuity,  where  benefits  are paid out  for  at  least ten
years, even in the case of the death  of both  spouses during that period
Longer  periods  of  guaranteed  benefits  and  different  spouses'  benefits  will  also  be
possible.  However,  all  contracts  must  be  lodged  with  the  insurance  supervisory  agency
(PUNU),  which will have the right to prohibit  certain contracts.
Individual  annuities  may  only  be  sold  with  the  written  consent  of the  (uninsured)
spouse. At  the  request  of  an  annuitant,  the  insurance  company  is  obliged to  convert  an
individual to  a joint  life annuity.  For example, if one spouse retires while the other  continues
working,  the couple may choose to take a single life annuity  until the second spouse retires.
Second pillar pension funds  in  1999
By June  1999 UNFE  granted  licenses to  21 pension  funds and refused to  give licenses
to  3 companies.  There  are no other  applications  waiting,  as newly  established pension  funds
would not have a chance to win a significant share of the market.  The first mergers are already
expected, due  to  consolidation  movements  in  the  Polish  banking  industry 40. Also  smaller
funds, that could breakeven are considering  mergers.
The total  size of the market is estimated at 11.5 million members, including 3.8 million
people born  after  1968, who are obliged to  join  a pension  fund  and  7.7 million people  born
between  1949 and  1968, who  may  participate  in the  fund  on voluntary  basis. The  authors
expect, that  in total  around  9 to  10 million  contributors  will- join  2 nd  pillar funds  (including
both  mandatory  and  voluntary  participants).  An  inflow  of  400  thousand  new  members
annually is projected for subsequent years.
By end of August 1999 around  6 million  people joined pension funds. The structure  of
the market  is concentrated.  The top  3 funds have around  70% of all pension fund  members
and the top  7 have 95% of the market.  This  situation  will lead to  a number  of mergers  and
acquisitions in the pension fund sector in the future. At the end, there  should be from  8 to  10
pension funds in Poland. However,  the  final shape and the size of the market will be known
by the end of 1999, when everybody  makes their  decisions about participation.
Most of those  who joined  pension  funds at the  beginning  of the year, were  younger
people whose participation  in the pension  funds is mandatory.  However,  they expressed their
The  pension  funds  law  does  not allow  one company  to be a shareholder  of more  than one  pension  fund. Thus,
any merger  of two banks  being  shareholders  of separate  pension  funds  results  in merger  of pension  funds.  In
mid-1999  two major  wholesale  banks  - Bank Handlowy  and BRE  Bank  - both being  shareholders  of separate
pension  funds  announced  merger.  This must be followed  by merger  of the pension  funds.
33preferences  by participating  in selected  funds  earlier  than required  by law. Some  people  born
between  1949-68  seemed  to delay  their decision  until the end of the year and in the meantime,
their contributions  continue  to flow into the social  insurance  fund and are registered  on the
individual  accounts.
Table  5. Age  structure  of  switchers  by  the  end  of May  1999:
Men  Women  Total  % of age  group
Born after 1968  787 514  942 163  1 729 677  45,2%*
Born between  1959-68  473 919  508 825  982 744  17,2%
Born between 1949-58  140  409  209  269  249 678  (total cohorts born between
Born between  1949-68  614 328  718 094  1 332 422  1948-68)
Total  1 401 842  1 660 257  3 062 099
Source:  ZUS
'*  Must  choose  2nd  pillar  fund by end  of September  1999
Note:  By  August  1999  the number  of pension  fund  members  doubled
By the end of July 1999,  the structure  of pension  fund portfolios  included  80 per cent
in treasury  bonds  and other government-backed  bonds  and an average  of 12  per cent  in stocks
and shares.  However,  this share varied  across  funds from 1.72  per cent to 24.67  per cent of
total assets.  For the first years  of pension  fund operations,  the portfolio  structure  should  be
similar,  as  funds  take into account  the relative  rate of return guarantee,  which is encouraging
them to invest  in less volatile  assets 4". In the future, the share  of portfolio invested  in stocks
should  increase  to provide significant  diversification  of retirement  savings  and prospects  for
better returns. Investment only in government  bonds may not provide competitive  net
returns  compared  to the notional  rate of  return.
3.5  MINIMUM  PENSION  GUARANTEE
The new  system  has  a guaranteed  minimum  pension,  set at the same  level  as in the old
system 42. It will be paid at the retirement age to people who have contributed  for a minimum
of 20 years (women) or 25 years (men). This benefit will top up pensions (the sum of both  first
and  second pillar) to the minimum  level. It will be financed from  general revenues, not  from
contributions  to the pension  system. This policy is designed to separate the redistributive  role
of  the  system  from  the  lifecycle  reallocation  of  income.  It  means  that  the  financing  of
minimum  pensions will  be on  broader tax base - including capital  and transfer  as well  as
labour  income  - than  the  rest  of the pension  system.  This  is contrary  to  the  old pension
41 The first relative rate of return will be announced  in two years time, when the fund members will be allowed
to change  a fund without a transfer fee.
42 Since 1  July 1999  equal to PLN 451,11 (approx.  33% of average  wage,  net of contributions) monthly, indexed
accordingly  to general  benefit indexation  rules.
34scheme, where minimum benefit was a part  of the  pay-as-you-go  scheme, not  a separate
guarantee.
Due  to  the  reduction of  intragenerational redistribution  in  the  new system, the
number of pensioners covered by a minimum pension guarantee is expected  to increase.  If the
indexation rules for the  minimum benefit are the same as for other benefits,  the  share of
pensioners  covered by this guarantee is estimated  to peak at 17 per cent in 2035  and gradually
decrease  to 7 per cent thereafter. However, close to price indexation of a minimum benefit
would  lead to  reduction  of  its  poverty  protection  role,  as  gradually it  would  become
ineffective  in reduction of relative poverty rates. If the minimum benefit was linked to a fixed
percentage of average  salary, the share of pensioners covered by this guarantee  would likely
remian at the level of around 15  per cent of all beneficiaries.
Most retirees covered by minimum guarantee  would be low-income  people with short
working careers 43. General revenue transfers to finance the minimum are estimated between
0.05 per cent of GDP if the indexation of minimum benefit follows general benefit indexation
to approximately 0.1 per cent of GDP, if it remains  equal to 30 per cent of average  wage.
3.6  THE  THIRD  PILLAR
A voluntary third pillar will supplement the universal, mandatory part of the pension
system (the first and second  pillars). It will consist of a number of long-term savings  plans and
occupational-pension programmes. This  makes the  system  more  flexible, allowing each
individual to  reallocate income across the  lifecycle  according to  their own preferences and
needs. The third pillar is more flexible than the first two pillars, with choice over the timing
and amount of saving and the ability to bequeath  the capital without restriction.
Many employers already  took  out group insurance  with a life insurance  company, with
the plans  negotiated individually  for each workplace.  This insurance is attractive  to employees
because  they avoid the information cost selecting from available products and assessing  the
risks of different insurers. Because  of the pooling of risks among the employees  of a particular
company, the  adverse selection risk  for  the  insurer  is reduced, so there is no  need for
individual medical interviews or health examinations.  The cost is deductible for employers,
but employees  are taxed on the employer contribution as a benefit in kind. This system will
continue as part of the employee  pension programs.
Growing awareness  of the uncertainty over the  real solvency of the present pension
system is the  reason why employees are increasingly  willing to  agree to  exchange current
wages for future pension benefits. Group life insurance policies with a set time for benefit
withdrawal with  optional life insurance are becoming popular.  Nevertheless, because it
requires employers voluntarily to establish  schemes,  it is limited in scope.
43 In the Polish  case  mostly  women  with lower education,  as  they have  shorter  than  average  working  careers  and
their  salary  income  is lower  than  those  of higher  educated  people  and men  in general.
35The new occupational  pension  plans
After the reform, employers will have the right to  direct employee contributions to
group insurance  with a joint-stock or mutual life-insurance  company, an occupational  pension
fund or to open investment funds.
An occupational  plan must meet the following  criteria
*  all eligible  employees  have an opportunity to participate
*  eligibility  conditions can only cover the employee's  tenure in the company and at least  half
of employees  must be eligible
e  payments on behalf on an individual employee cannot exceed seven per cent of earnings
assessable  for social security contributions
*  benefits  be paid out from age 60, except  in cases  of death or permanent disability
The detailed rules for the functioning of an occupational  plan must be defined in a
company pension  contract negotiated  with employees'  representatives.
Contributions paid on  behalf of the employee will be a deductible expense for the
employer. They will be included in personal income when the employee is taxed, but up to
the seven  per cent ceiling,  they will not be subject  to social security contributions. Additional
contribution  can be paid by  employees, but it  is neither income tax nor  social security
contribution deductible.
Although the  terms  of  group insurance or  payments to  investment  fund will be
negotiated between  the employer and the plan management  company,  there will be some  legal
requirements to qualify as an employee  pension  programme.
Occupational pension funds will operate along similar lines as second-pillar  schemes.
However, there  will be fewer portfolio restrictions, no  minimum rate  of  return, more
influence for participants on  the  fund's investment policies, including the  possibility of
investing all the assets  in an open investment  fund.
In the case  of setting up an employee  pension fund, the employer is also able to make
employee participation depending on  the contribution  of a  (uniform) proportion  of  the
company's shares received  during privatisation  of the enterprise within five years. This limits
the  risk that a large part of the company's shares return to the market following an initial
public offering after the two-year waiting period imposed on employees. This overhang of
shares  is a significant  fear among  potential investors.
The legislation also aims to  make occupational pensions portable when employees
change  jobs. The employee will have  the right to transfer the assets  to the pension plan of the
new  employer or  to  an  insurance company, open  investment fund  or  a  non-employer-
sponsored  plan.
36Regulation, supervision and taxation
Since the  third  pillar involves a  range of different institutions, supervision will be
spread across different authorities: bank supervisors, the state insurance supervision office
(PUNU) and the  securities and exchange commission (SEC). The pension-fund supervision
office (UNFE) will cover employees'  rights in occupational  schemes.
The third  pillar will be taxed using the  pre-paid expenditure tax approach, where
contributions are made out of taxed income, but investment returns and benefit withdrawals
will be tax free (i.e.,  taxed-exempt  exempt or TEE). Although this means a similar or even the
same present value of tax will be paid, it brings forward the revenues to government to the
time contributions are made rather than the time benefits  are received (see  Whitehouse, 1998).
3.7  ESTIMA TED  BENEFITS  FROM THE  MANDATORY PILLARS
The  actual  value  of  the  benefit  from  first  and  second  pillars  depends  on  the
development  of labour and financial  markets. In this section, we provide some estimates  of the
value of pensions for  different cohorts covered by  the  reform, as well as for  different
assumptions  of wage growth and financial  market returns.
Replacement rates are  constant for  people with  different wage levels, up  to  the
maximum earnings cap, assuming  that the relative ratios of individuals'  wages  to average  wage
are constant over the contribution period. Projections are based on average  wage earners, but
the same  estimate applies  to other levels  of earnings (up to a maximum earnings  cap).
The baseline assumption set  for calculations  includes:
*  Average wage  earners, starting career at age  25
*  Average wage  growth: 4%,  thus notional rate of return 3%
*  Rate of return from funded pillar: 6%
*  Administrative fee from contributions: 5%
*  Administrative fee from assets:  0.6%
K  Annuity company fee:  6% of balance  at retirement
*  Rate of return on annuity: 2%
*  Current life expectancy.
In the transition period, the replacement rates (measured as a ratio between the first
benefit received from  the  old-age system  and  the  last salary) depend not  only  on  the
development of the new system after reform implementation, but also on the value of the
initial capital.  Thus, replacement  rates  change for each cohort, as presented in Figure 6.
37Figure  6. Projected  replacement  rates in the new pension  system,
cohorts  1949-74
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Due to differentiation  in retirement age, replacement rates differ for men and women.
The difference between the  genders is stable at  the  level of approximately 20 percentage
points, which results  from 5 year difference  in retirement age. Additionally, for women born
in 1949-1953,  adjustment in mixed formula causes  increase in replacement rates, compared  to
the initial proposal.
For men, replacement  rates drops from 76 per cent in the old system, through almost
the same level for the cohort 1949, to  approximately 60 per cent for new entrants to the
system.  For women, replacement  rate drops sharply from almost 70 per cent in the old system
to slightly above 50 per cent for cohort 1954  (first that is not covered by a mixed pension
formula), then decrease  is more stable and projected replacement rate for new entrants is
below  50 per cent level.
Under reasonable  assumptions, replacement rates are higher for those who decide  to
participate in the funded pillar. The gap between first pillar only and first and second pillar
participation  increases  for younger people, as returns from financial  market are assumed  to be
higher than the notional return  in the pay-as-you-go  scheme. For the  youngest cohort with
non  mandatory  participation  in  the  funded  pillar,  difference in  replacement  rates is
approximately  10 per cent
The other element  that depends  on the age of participants in the system is the share of
the benefit generated  by the funded component. Obviously, it will be increasing  for younger
participants. The increase  however, does not reflect the share of contribution diverted to the
second  pillar. For the cohort born in 1949,  the estimated share of the second pillar annuity in
the total benefit reaches 14 per cent and increases  year by year to exceed 50 per cent for new
entrants (compared  with 32.5 per cent of old-age contribution shifted to  the second pillar).
The estimates  do not take into account changes  in the  real benefit value in first and second
pillars,  that  occur  due to  the  indexation  of  benefits.  Draft  annuity  law  enforces  annuity
38indexation at least to prices, whereas in the fist pillar, indexation should not be lower than 20
per cent of real wage  growth.
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Note:  First pillar share refers to sum of  initial capital and accumulated notional  contributions.
Contribution  rate assumed to remain constant
As the  benefit formula is actuarially adjusted, replacement rates increase with the
retirement age. A person starting to work at age 25, and continuing until retirement without
any breaks can expect  a replacement  rate of around 44 per cent at the age of 60, 62 per cent at
the age of 65 and finally, almost 90 per cent at the  age of 70. The marginal increase in
replacement  rates also depends on the retirement age and varies from 2.5 per cent for 60 year
olds to  more than 5 per cent for 70 year olds. Thus, both  first and second pillars benefit
formulae encourage  postponing retirement decision,  offering higher replacement rates year by
year. This does not necessarily  mean that the net present value of the benefit increases  for each
additional  year, as individual's  preferences  may differ.
39Figure 8. Projected replacement rates in the new system
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Assumptions:  see text
Estimates of the replacement rates are sensitive to  assumptions. In order  to investigate
the influence of work  duration,  longevity  rates and rates of return, we projected benefits with
alternative  scenarios  (Figure  8).  If  a  working  career  is  5  years  shorter  than  in  the  initial
projection,  the  replacement  rates  are reduced  by  6 to  10 per  cent,  depending  on the  retirement
age and  they  fall to  the  level  of 40 per  cent  for  retirees  at age 60 to  77 per  cent  for  those  who
retire  at 70.
In  the  case  of  higher  gross  returns  (8  per  cent,  compared  to  baseline  6  per  cent),
replacement  rates  increase  by  10 to  28  per  cent  for  70 year  old retiree  and  range  from  almost
55 per  cent to  115 per  cent.  Also,  the  share  of funded  component  in the  initial  value  of benefit
increases to  62 per  cent  for  65 year  olds.
Changes  in  longevity  also  have  an  impact  on  replacement  rates.  If  life  expectancy
increases  by  approximately  2 years,  replacement  rates  are lower  by  almost  5 to  9 per  cent  and
fall to  40 per  cent  for  those  retiring  at  60 and  78 per  cent for  70 years  old.
40Figure  9. Projected  replacement  rates  in the new system  - sensitivity  analysis
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413.8  EARLY RETIREMENTAND SECTOR PRIVILEGES
The reform aims to  eliminate all privileges in the old universal  pension  system, with
equal  treatment  of  all  participants  with  regard  to  retirement  age,  means  of  paying
contributions  and calculating benefits. Sector privileges were largely  an inheritance  from  the
planned economy era - many were introduced  in the  1980s  during  the period of martial  law
- but  some had a much earlier provenance  (railway workers  were  given privileges by  the
Austro-Hungarian  emperor  in  the  19th century).  It  is estimated, that  approximately  24 per
cent  of the  workforce  enjoyed  some  kind  of special privilege. Additionally,  women  could
retire  at age 55, if they had at least 30 years of work  experience. Successful elimination  of all
privileges  would  improve  the  pension  system's  finances  enormously.  The  'cost'  of  early
retirement  alone is equivalent to  12 percentage points  of the total 45 per cent contribution.
The problem  of privilege-based early retirement  is compounded  by the possibility  to
continue  working after drawing  early pensions,  almost without  restriction.  There is a strong
incentive  to  take  the  early  retirement  pension,  but  then  continue  to  work.  This  was  for
example the  case of teachers.  Most of them  after  retirement  continues  working  at schools,
receiving both salary and old-age pension.
In  the  new system,  first  and  second pillars  do  not  include  any  special privileges  as
pensions will be paid for those  reaching the minimum  retirement  age.
For those, who work  in special conditions, that  cannot be performed  until  retirement
age, the  period  of permissible  time  of work  will be  sanctioned  in  law.  After  this  period  a
worker  will have to  change his/her  work  position  or profession  and  could be provided  by
help  in  finding  a  new  work  or  in  changing  the  qualifications.  The  medical  criteria  to
acknowledge  certain  working  conditions  as  'special'  were  presented  in  the  report  of  an
independent  Medical Committee.  On the basis of the statistical and  medical data, the Medical
Committee  determined for selected jobs a maximum  period of work,  which will not  cause a
detriment  of health in particular professions and positions'..
For  the transition  period, for those who  started their working  career before 1999 and
could expect early retirement  another solution is envisaged.
All those, who stay in the old system (i.e. born  before 1949) will have a right to  retire
at  lower  retirement  age  and  their  pension  will  be  calculated  according  to  old  rules.
Additionally,  also those  working  in  professions eligible to  lower  retirement  age (provided
they work  there until they reach stated earlier retirement  age), born  between  1949 and  1968,
who:
4  Plenipotentiary,  Ewa Lewicka  asked leading  home  institutes  and  international  organizations  to  delegate
experts, who  could participate  in the work  of independent  committee. The committee  presented  its report  in
April  1999.
42*  fulfill all three conditions  (age, total working period and working period in special
conditions)  until 31 December  2006  will be eligible  to earlier  retirement  according  to the
old rules (this  applies  also  to women)
e  on January 1, 1999  had fulfilled  two conditions  related  to work experience,  but they will
not have  required  age  until 31  December  2006  will  be entitled  to earlier  retirement  age  but
their pension will be calculated  on the basis  of the new formula.  Initial Capital  of such
people  will be increased  by adding to contributable  periods the difference  between  the
general  retirement  age  and  their retirement  age.  E.g.  Pension  of  the person  that will retire  5
years  before  legal  retirement  age  will be calculated  as  if that person  worked  5 years  longer
than actually  did.  The old-age  pension  of such  person  will be lower  than that of a person
retiring  at minimal  retirement  age  with the same  notional  capital  value.
If somebody  chooses  earlier  retirement  on the basis  described  above,  he or she will  not
be permitted  to join the second  pillar. Second  pillar  arrangements  are not suitable  for solving
rights from the old system.  People that decide  to participate  in one of the capital  pension
funds  (2nd pillar) automatically  forfeit  the right  to earlier  retirement.
All of these groups have the right of choice.  The final shape of the solutions  is
discussed  between  representatives  of government,  employers  and trade unions,  which aim to
prepare  additional  solutions  coping  with special  working  conditions.
For giving  up the right to earlier  retirement,  employees  can  join a pension  fund pillar,
continue  working  until legal  retirement  age  and additionally  have  financial  compensation  - in
different  forms depending  on the list of professions  requiring  earlier  cessation  of the activity,
similar  to those, who do not have  a right  to retire  earlier.
Those born between  1949  and 1968,  who did not fulfil required  conditions  at the
moment  of the beginning  starting  reform  will not have  right  to retire  earlier  in the new  social
insurance  system.  Instead  they will be offered  one of  the two compensations  below:
*  If the Medical  Committee  decided  that the job performed  by these  people  requires  earlier
cessation  of  professional  activity (e.g. miners, pilots, train  drivers) special bridging
arrangements  will be created,  which allow them finish  their professional  activity  earlier.
Sources  of financing  such  a solution  will be subject  of negotiations.  It will not be allowed
to combine  this benefit  with employment
*  If the profession  will not be on the list worked  out by the Medical  Committee,  employees
will  receive  compensation  based  on the fact,  that this job was  recognized  in old system  as  a
profession  requiring  earlier  retirement  age.  The initial  capital  will be increased  in the first
pillar  of a new system,  and this will lead  to a higher  pension  in the future  at the normal
retirement  age  (e.g.  teachers,  railway  company  employees)
Bridging  pensions  will  be financed  from separate  contributions  accumulated  in a special
fund,  called  the 'bridging  pensions  fund'.  The fund  will pay a 'bridge'  pension  from the earlier
age at which working career is finished to the minimal retirement  age. The additional
contributions  from the day when the bridging  pensions  law is enacted  will be financed  by
employers,  while  the contribution  representing  the rights  accrued  in the past  will  be paid  from
43the  state budget. This will make the trade-offs in  granting special privileges clearer. The
bridging fund management  will be contracted out to private asset managers. This system will
be  accessible  for those, who  work  in  conditions, which by  medical criteria cannot  be
performed until retirement age  because  of the threat of health loss (e.g. working underground,
underwater or  in  changing microclimate) or  because they  require  high  psycho-physical
condition (e.g.  pilots, engine drivers). Bridging  pensions would be set up as a defined benefit
scheme. The actual value of the benefit will be negotiated between employers, trade unions
and government.
Figure  10 Calendar  of early  retirement  scheme  withdrawal
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(1)  Assumed  enactment  of  bridging  pensions  law;
(2) It is enough if a person fulfills  conditions prior to 2007,  and then can retire even later;
(3) Maximum bridge: 20 years,  this includes also people that undergo retraining;
Assumption: work career starts  at age 20
Negotiations of bridging pensions started in June 1999. At the time of writing, they
were still continuing, thus it is not possible to  give any reasonable financial estimates of
required benefit level and state budget financing, as the level of  bridging pensions is not
known.  This  decision will  determine the  actual  rate  of  employer  and  state  budget
contributions  necessary to  finance bridging pensions. Additionally, until  the  individual
accounts in ZUS are established,  there is no information on number of people covered by
special  arrangements  (both bridging pensions  and initial capital  compensation).
The envisaged  solution will increase  the overall costs of the pension expenditures, as
state budget will be required to  make additional transfers to  bridging pension fund  and
pensions paid for those who will receive compensation will be higher than assumed in
projections. Because  of the lack of appropriate information, these effects  are not included in
the projections  presented  in further sections  of this paper.
444.  PAYG system -financing  the transition 45
The pension  reform  had a significant impact on the  functioning  of institutions  of the
social security system.  Starting from  the  first  year, it also affects the  revenues of the  pay-as-
you-go  scheme, as part  of the  old-age contribution  is transferred  to  the  funded  pillar.  This
effect depends on the  size of switching to the second pillar. The more people decide to  switch,
the  deeper cash-flow deficit in the short  term.  Savings caused by the pension  reform  appear
only  in  medium-term  perspective,  as old  system  rules  are  preserved  by  the  end  of  2006.
Savings generated in the short run result from  close to price indexation  of benefits, introduced
in  1994 (see section  2). Savings resulting  from  increase in  retirement  age and  reduction  of
benefits appear after 2006. The level of savings is lower than  initially  expected, due to  several
transition  regulations which  were introduced  in the legislative process.
This  section  analyses both  changes  resulting  from  the  introduction  of  the  funded
component  in retirement  savings and  financial implications  of transition  rules in  the enacted
regulations.
4.1.  JOINING  THE SECOND PILLAR
Voluntary  participation  in the  second pillar  for people  born  between  1949 and  1968
introduces  an  element  of  choice,  which  is  socially, economically  and  politically  desirable
(Palacios and Whitehouse,  1998). However,  this  raises the  problem  of predicting  how  many
people will choose different  options and makes it more difficult to  get a clear picture  of long-
term obligations (Holzmann,  1997).
Predicting the  decisions of people aged between 30 and 50 on whether  to  switch from
the  first  pillar to  the  mixed first  and  second  pillar  option  is a difficult task.  One  possible
source of information  is opinion polls. These suggest that  most  people will choose to join the
second pillar. A second  source is experience in  other countries,  of which the most  relevant is
Hungary 46. Opinion  polls there  suggested people were very  optimistic  about funded  pensions
Projections  and  forecasts  presented  in this  paper  are  based on  enacted  legislation  and  long-term  proposals
included  in pension  reform  program  (such as lowering contribution  rates). For  the  short  and  medium-term
analysis we used Social 'Budget Model, prepared  in Gdansk  Institute  for  Market  Economics  in  co-operation
with  ILO  and Polish  Ministry  of Labour  and  Social affairs. It produces  20 year  forecast of all  social funds,
including pension system,  based on final legislation outcome.
For  long-term  projections  a  model  prepared  in the  Office of  the  Government  Plenipotentiary  for  Social
Security Reform is used. This allows for comparison  of initial proposal  and final version  of the pension  reform
legislation package.
46  However,  there are significant  differences between  the  new pay-as-you-go pillars in Poland and  Hungary.  In
Hungary,  it remained within  defined benefit regime, downsized for those  who  switch to the pension  fund.  In
Poland,  regardless  the decision, contributors  are covered by the NDC  first pillar.
45and  pessimistic about the  state  scheme (see Palacios and Rocha, 1998 and Palacios and
Whitehouse, 1998).
In order to analyse  incentives  towards switching, one has to analyse  the return on 7.3
per cent of contribution in the first and second pillar, taking into account such elements as
wage growth and notional account indexation, projected market returns, pension fund and
annuity company fees (as discussed in section 3.3, fee structure in Poland affects  to a higher
extent pension fund members with shorter savings  periods).
Decision whether to  switch or  not depends on a difference  between the  projected
accumulated capital from 7.3% contribution in  the  first and second pillar accounts, given
anticipated returns on contributions. Projected differences between first and second pillar
value of accumulated  pension rights or capital  are presented on Figure 11.
Figure 11. Difference  between  Polish  NDC and  funded  schemes  accumulation
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Assumptions:
Wage  growth: 4%
Notional interest rate: 3%
Adrministrative  fee on contribution: 6%
Administrative  fee on assets:  0.6%
Annuity company fee:  6%  of accumulated  assets
According  to  projections,  if  gross  returns  in  the  funded  pillar  are  equal  to  wage
growth,  it is not  worth  switching,  because the  notional  rate of return  (after costs) is higher.
Generally,  international  evidence shows, that in the medium term, returns  of private  pension
funds are higher than wage growth 47. If it is the case in Poland - the breakeven point depends
on the  difference between  the  wage growth  and  rate of return.  In the case of one per  cent
difference, it is 18 years, if the difference is 2 per  cent, than  this period shrinks  to  11 years.
47  See: Palacios (1999)  and OECD  (1998)  for 1984-1996  rates of return  and wage growth.
46However,  in either case the difference between first and second pillar accumulated assets is not
that  significant for  those  with  shorter  accumulation  period  from  the annuity  point  of view
(projected difference in the annuity  value is less than  PLN  20 (approx. USD  5) per month.  If
the differences between the  value of the  annuity  in the first  and second pillars  do not  differ
significantly, people for  diversification  reasons should  participate  in the second  pillar.  If the
expected market  gross rate of return  is higher than  the notional  rate of return,  all those who
do not  have any early retirement  privileges should switch.
The  incentive  to  switch  is  higher  than  assumed  in  earlier  analyses 4'  due  to  the
reduction  in the notional  rate  of return  below wage bill  growth.  Such regulation  affects to a
larger extent  those who will not  switch, because their  full old-age contribution  will be indexed
at  a  lower  rate.  Those  who  switch  will  earn  full  financial  market  returns  on  their
contributions  in the second  pillar.  As  a result, more  switching will take place  and this  will
increase short  run social security  deficit.
The financial effect of switching  in 1999 is lower than  in later years however,  because
of the time  schedule of switching  decisions. Until  one switches, his full contribution  remains
in  the  pay-as-you-go  pillar,  increasinig the  notional  capital  and  therefore  pay-as-you-go
liabilities 49. As a result, the pace at which people switch to the second pillar has a large impact
on  the  finances  of  the  system.  During  the  first  months  of  pension  funds  enrolment,  the
number  of pension fund members  increased by approximately  one million per  month  (in the
period of March - August 1999 total of 6 million participants).
In  order  to  estimate  the  financial  impact  of  switching  decisions to  PAYG  pension
system  deficit, two  projections  of participation  were  prepared  (Table 6). One  assumes that
everybody who is entitled switches, and the other  assumes that participation  will decline with
age. The  latter  bases on the  fact that  compound-interest  effect means that  younger  workers
will get a higher  return  from  the  funded  pension,  and  so have a larger incentive  to  switch.
This  age-related pattern  also  occurred  in  all other  countries  introducing  a reform  involving
some element  of individual  choice: Argentina,  Chile,  Colombia,  Hungary,  Peru,  the United
Kingdom  and Uruguay  (Palacios and Whitehouse,  1998). However,  in the discussed examples
switching population  covered all age cohorts,  while in the case of Poland, switching  is limited
to those  below  50 years  of age and  people who  have a choice  still have at least  10 years of
contributing  ahead.
4S Security  through  Diversity  (1997c)
4  From the year 2000,  the new entrants to the labor market are forced to switch within 3 months. During the
decision period, the contribution is kept on the separate account, and after they choose a fund, the nominal
contributions are transferred  to the selected  pension fund.
47Table 6. Projected  pension  revenues  and expenditures,  transfer  to
pension  fund  and reserves  in 1999-2006  (% GDP)
YEAR  |11999  12000 12001  12002  12003 12004 12005 12006
50% of switchers
Pension revenues  5.64% 15.14% 15.14% 4.78%  4.75%  4.73%  4.70% -4.67%
Pension expenditures  5.92% 1575% 5.59%  5.42%  5.25%  5.09%  4.95%  4.82%
Deficit /surplus  -0.28% -0.62% -0.46% -0.64% -0.50% -0.36% -0.24% -0.15%
2nd pillar transfer  0.53%  1.22%  1.36%  1.49% 1.61%  1.73%  1.86%  1.97%
100%  of switchers
Pension revenues  5.19% 4.37% 4.38% 4.05% 4.04% 4.05% 4.06% 4.06%
Pension expenditures  5.92% 5.75%  5.59%  5.42%  5.25%  5.09%  4.95%  4.82%
Deficit /surplus  -0.74%  -1.38% -1.21% -1.37% -1.20% -1.04% -0.89% -0.76%
2nd pillar transfer  0.85%  1.89% 2.05%  2.20% 2.33%  2.46%  2.58%  2.68%
Source: Social Budget Model
If  the  number  of  switchers  turns  out  to  be  higher  than  assumed  by  the  Polish
government  (roughly  50%), the deficit in the Social Insurance Fund  (FUS) will be higher than
claimed. According  to  the  social insurance law,  it must  be  covered  from  the  state  budget.
Given  the  constrained  budget  deficit,  other  budgetary  expenditures  would  have  to  be
reduced 50. The final outcome, however, will not be known until the end of the 1999, when the
switching process has ended.
If participation  exceeds expectations, the effect will not  be disastrous. As argued in the
original Security through Diversity proposal,  much of the revenue diverted to funded pensions
will  return  to  the  state  treasury  through  increased  demand  for  bonds,  allowing  non-
inflationary  financing  of the increased deficit. The other  part  will be invested in the  capital
market.  In other  words,  higher household  saving offsets the  reduction  in  public  sector  net
saving. These arguments  were supported  by the  OECD's  (1998) analysis of the reform  in its
economic survey of Poland.  In 1999 international  rating agencies increased country  rating for
Poland partly as a result of pension reform introduction,
Privatisation  revenues  will be  used to  help finance  the  deficit in  the  social-security
system, as specified by the first part of the pension  reform package (1997). According to the
treasury's  plans,  PLN  53bn will be  available to  support  the  reform  (about 14 per  cent  of
GDP), with PLN  4bn allocated in the 1999 budget. This amount  will be sufficient to  fill the
gap  in  the  Social  Security  Fund,  even if  more  people than  initially  estimated  by  Polish
government switch to the pension funds.
s According  to both the Polish  constitution  and the Maastricht  criteria,  the state budget  deficit  may not exceed
the limit of 3 % of GDP. According  to 1999  state budget, the deficit should not exceed  2.4  per cent of GDP.
The Polish government  agreed in July 1999,  that next year's figure should be less than 2 per cent of GDP.
48The deficit in the pay-as-you-go  retirement scheme is expected to  decrease, due to
reduction of expenditures  caused  by earlier changes  in indexation of benefits and by reduction
of early retirement policies  in the new system.  As a result, after 2010  the public scheme  should
have a surplus. The projected  surplus is smaller in the case of higher switching and appears  in
2012.
Figure 12. Deficitisurplus  in the PAYG  old-age pension  fund in 1999-2020
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As the deficit in the pay-as-you-go  scheme  is financed from privatization proceeds,  and
in the case of deficit, mainly from taxes (given  state budget deficit constraints that cannot be
exceeded),  the projected deficit  figure ignores accumulated  interest in the assumption that it is
not debt financed.
The switching decision has a significant  impact on pension funds' asset accumulation.
In 2020, depending on the number of switchers, total value of accumulated assets may vary
from 23 per cent of GDP to 35 per cent of GDP (Figure 13).
49Figure 13. Accumulation of assets in Polish open pension funds, 1999-2020
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As only  a small fraction  of assets can  be invested  abroad,  accumulation  of pension
funds  will strengthen  the  Polish  financial market.  Pension  funds are expected to  create the
strongest group of institutional  investors, as other forms of savings are not that developed, due
to voluntary  participation.  As up to 40 per cent of assets can be invested in stocks, the Polish
securities market  is expected  to  increase its  volume.  This process  will be  accompanied by
increased privatization,  as privatization  proceeds will be needed to  finance deficit in the pay-
as-you-go pillar.  Pension  fund  managers  plan  to  invest  a  significant  share  of  assets into
government  bonds, which  is merely  a change from  implicit debt  to  explicit one.  Even this
effect can positively influence Polish economy,  as budget deficit cannot  exceed 3 per cent of
GDP threshold. In a long run, Polish market will not  be able to absorb capital flows generated
by the  pension  funds.  Thus,  changes in  investment  limitations  in  the  area of  international
diversification will be required. Additionally,  as a part of EU accession process Poland would
need to adjust the financial market regulations on capital movements.
4.2.  EARLY  RETIREMENT  SCHEMES AND  IMPACT  OFPHASING-OUTRULES
Another  important  element that had  an impact on medium-term  expenditures are the
changes to  the initial  reform  proposal,  mostly  related to  early  retirement  privileges. In  the
final  regulations, there  are three  major changes compared  to  the  initial  reform  proposal,  all
aimed to  smooth  the transition  between the  old and  the new system.  Those  changes create
additional expenditures for the pension system. They include:
a right to  retire according to  old-rules for those  who accrue pension  rights to  the end  of
2006. This regulation covers: women born  in 1949-51,  retiring at age 55, miners with more
than  17 years of work  experience under  ground  (can retire after 25 years of working) and
teachers with  25 years  of experience (can retire  after 30 years  of working)  - introduced
during the consultations  in Tripartite commission;
50*  a right to retire at early retirement age after 2006 for those who fulfilled  work experience
criteria (20(w)  or 25(m)  years of working, including 10 to 15 in special  conditions) prior to
reform introduction. This regulation covers part of women older than approx. 38 and men
older than 43 - introduced during Parliamentary  discussions;
. mixed pensions for  retirees in  2009-2013.  This  increases replacement rates  for  the
mentioned groups - introduced during Parliamentary discussions.
Relative to  the  initial reform  proposal, these  changes have an  impact  on  both
expenditures and revenues of the old-age system. This impact can be observed, according to
projections between 2003 and 2020 (Figure 14). Prior  to  2003, there  are  no  changes in
expenditures, because all people above  50 years of  age are  covered by  the  old  system
regulations. The  revenues of the  pension system depend  on  the  number  of  switchers.
Projections  in  this  section  assume that  the  switching  process  depends  on  age  and
approximately half of the contributors born between 1968  and 1949  decided  to switch.
The  most significant differences in  the pension system balance between the  initial
proposal and legislated  solutions can be observed in the period between 2003 and 2009, after
that the differences  become smaller, as:cohorts covered by reform start to retire according to
legal retirement age (60  for women and 65 for men).
Transition  rules implemented in  the  Polish legislation have only  a  medium term
impact on the stability of the PAYG pension system. This increased  expenditure will create
additional seven years of deficit in the old-age  pension fund. The annual deficit in the period,
however, should not exceed 1 per cent of GDP (unless more people switch to  the funded
pllar).  This is mainly a result of favorable situation in the labor market and growth of the
covered wage bill. This happens for two reasons. First  is the expected growth of wage bill
above GDP growth, a result of increasing wage bill/GDP  ratio 5". In 1998  it was equal to 33
per cent and by 2020 it is expected  to rise to 40 per cent. The second reason is an increase  in
labor force supply, as a generation  of 1980s  baby-boom  is entering to workforce 52.
The drop in the old-age  pension system revenues observed in 2002 is related to the
transfer of  the  part  of  the  old-age contribution to  the  demographic reserve fund,  as a
precaution against worsening balance of the system after 2020, caused by rapid increase of
dependency rates.
As discussed  earlier, the pension reform introduces savings in expenditures after 2006.
According to projections, the old system would run deficits after 2015, while the reformed
system in the its final shape  starts to create surpluses  in 2011.
Stemming from  increase in labour productivity  and broadening the  contribution  base. For  example, in Poland,
company cars are not covered by social insurance contribution,  which  is expected to be changed in the future.
5  This demographic  wave was quite significant in Poland, because of the  marshal law in the  early  1980s. During
these period Poland experienced very high fertility  rates, partially  explained by introduction  of the curfew after
8 p.m.
51Figure 14 Medium-term impact of final pension rules vs. Security through
diversity  proposal
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524.3.  OVERALL SAVINGSRATEINTHEPENSIONSYSEM" 3
The impact of pension reform on national savings  has several sources.  These are private
savings accumulated in  pension funds  and public savings in  PAYG pension system, that
according to projections appear after 2011. Figure 15 shows the combined impact of the two
elements on the total savings  rate. The additional transfer to demographic  reserve  fund is also
presented. This transfer does not generate any savings  in the economy, as it increases  PAYG
system deficit in 2002-2008,  however because  those funds are invested in the capital market, it
may have  some impact on public savings,  given state budget deficit constraint.
In the projection period, the  total  savings rate is positive already in  1999. This is a
result of expected surplus in the pay-as-you-go  system without  any transfer to the  funded
pillar. Thus, combined public and private savings reflect this surplus. Savings  generated by
private funded pillar increase  annually, as more contributors participate in pension funds. By
2020,  the expected net inflow to the second pillar reaches 3 per cent of GDP. Savings  increase
significantly  after 2011, when the pay-as-you-go  pension fund reaches  surplus. Overall annual
savings  rate grows from almost zero in 1999  to 5 per cent of GDP in 2020.
Savings  in the old age system are presented as a gross flow. Pension reform introduces
additional general revenue transfers to pay-as-you-go  system, in the form of contribution for
military service  and maternity leave. These are estimated  at the level of approximately  0.2 per
cent of GDP annually. Also, after 2010 state budget will finance minimum pension guarantee
for pensioners, which may decrease  the overall savings  rate by between 0.05 and 0.1 per cent
of GDP" 4.
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Source: Social budget model
5  This  section  does not  cover  additional  expenditures  generated by  bridging  pension  systems, as discussed in
section 3.8
54  Minimum pension  for beneficiaries in the  old system is financed from  Social Security Fund, which  is captured
by overall deficit/surplus  of the pay-as-you-go system.
535.  Long term  impact  of pension  reform
In  order  to  evaluate  overall  impact of the  pension  reform  on  the  stability  of PAYG
system,  several  projections  were  prepared.  The  baseline  situation  is  based  on  the  current
legislation  and  long-term  goals of the pension  reform.  Assumptions  in  the  baseline scenario
include:
- GDP growth  of 3.5% annually
- decrease in  contribution  rate  to  pay-as-you-go pillar  from  12.22 per  cent  to  7.3 per  cent
between 2013 and 2030
- retirement  age at current  level - 60 for women and 65 for men
- increase in longevity to current  Swedish rates by 2030
- 65 per cent of the population  born  1949-68  participates  in funded scheme
- indexation of benefits at CPI plus 20% of average real wage growth
- notional  accounts indexation  at 75% of wage bill growth
- Increase in wage bill /  GDP  ratio to 40 per cent
- Covered wage bill: 80 per cent of total wage bill (current  estimates)
- increase in participation  rates in labor force by 20 per cent
According to  baseline scenario, the initial period  of deficit, caused by shifting part  of
the  contribution  to funded  pillar  and later, by the  worsening  demographic  situation  will last
until  2001. After  that,  the  old-age fund will have an  annual surplus of approximately  0.7 per
cent  of GDP.  The surplus will be smaller in the 2020s, due to  retirement  of the post-war baby
boom  generation  and additional  reduction  of contribution  revenues, because of the retirement
of cohorts that  do not participate  fully in the funded  pillar vs. cohorts entering  labour market
who  split  contribution  between  first  and  second  pillars.  Approximately  by  2035  all
contributors  will be participating  in the funded pillar  and changes in  revenues level after this
date  can be attributed  only  to  changes in labour force and average wage. During  this period,
the  revenues of the pay-as-you-go old-age fund will drop from  current  6 per cent to  2 per cent
of GDP,  and expenditures  will drop from 6.5 per cent to  1.5 per cent of GDP.
The alternative  scenarios  assume changes in  the  assumptions  to  investigate  impact  of
economic and demographic development  on the pension  system.
a. Constant  contribution  scenario
Compared  to baseline assumption, the contribution  rate was kept on the current  level:
19.52 per cent until 2008 and 18.52 per cent thereafter  (current legislated level).
The  most  significant  difference concerns the  revenue  side,  as there  is no  additional
reduction  of revenues caused by reduction  of contribution.  At  the end  of projection  period,
revenues will be on the  level of 4 per  cent of GDP.  Changes in contribution  rates have also
54impact on expenditures  side. Higher  contributions  will be registered  on the notional  accounts
and  create higher implicit debt to  working population. This will cause increase in
expenditures  by additional  0.5  per cent  of GDP compared  to the baseline  scenario.  The  overall
result of this projection  is a significant  surplus  in the pay-as-you-go  old-age  fund, exceeding  the
level of 1 per cent  of GDP annually.
b. Increased  retirement age scenario
In the case  of increased  retirement  age  to 65 for women and 66 for men, revenues  of
the PAYG old-age  fund will increase  compared  to baseline  and expenditures  will drop down.
The most significant  impact of this change  could  be observed  between  2010  and 2030,  when
the system  still pays obligations  to cohorts in old system  and transition period, when the
replacement  rates are still on a high level.  Increase  in retirement  ages does not have that
significant  influence  by 2050,  both as a result  of actuarial  adjustments  in pension  payments  and
reduction  of system  liabilities  in the new  first  pillar.
c. current survival rates
Assuming  no changes  in the longevity  rates for Polish population,  one can observe
additional  improvement  of PAYG old-age  fund surplus.  This change  increases  the surplus  by
approximately  0.2 per cent of GDP, which  is not very significant.  However,  further increase
in longevity  can  have  substantial  influence  on the expenditures  of  the system.
d. higher switching
Scenario  assumes  that 90 per cent of the population  born between 1949  and 1968
decided  to switch  to the funded  pillar.  This has  a negative  impact  on PAYG  system  during  the
first years  of the new  system  functioning,  as  old PAYG system  still  pays  its obligations,  while
revenues  are significantly  reduced.  In the long run, however  the expenditures  of the old-age
system are lower in years 2015-2040,  as part of the old-age  liabilities  for those cohorts was
shifted to the private  sector. The total present  value  of higher  switching  should  be positive,
but from the point of view of the short term financial  liquidity of the system  it is less
desirable,  as  discussed  in previous  sections.
e. higher indexation of benefits
If the benefit indexation was increased  to  50 per cent of average  wage growth,
expenditures  of the PAYG system  would  increase,  especially  during  first decades  after  reform
introduction,  as liabilities  of the public  scheme  are still very high.  In the long run this effect
has a smaller  impact  on expenditures,  increasing  them by approx.  0.3  to 0.5 per cent of GDP
annually.  Changes  in indexation  principles  do not have  any impact  on.
f. lower  economic  growth
In this scenario  we assumed  a growth  rate at 1.5%  annually.  Lower economic  growth
affects  mostly  the expenditures  of the pension  system,  as the model  assumes  a link between
GDP growth  and wage  growth. Expenditures  are increased,  as the result  of lower indexation
both of benefits  and notional accounts  are not that significant,  as it is in the case  of higher
growth rates.  In this scenario,  the public  PAYG  system  is in deficit  in the period of 2020-2034,
55where there is the  worst combination of economic and demographic conditions for the
pension  system.
g. higher indexation of notional accounts
The last scenario assumes  full indexation of notional accounts,  to the wage  bill growth.
As a result, expenditures increase after 2014, when people covered by the new system are
retiring. This change leads to  lower surplus, compared to  baseline scenario, but  still, the
system is not creating  any deficit after 2014.
Generally,  the long term prospects of the public PAYG scheme after the introduced
pension reform are quite good. However, the system is not  immune to  developments of
economy, such as lower growth, as well as political factors, such as changes in  benefit or
notional  accounts indexation. If  the  assumed characteristics will  be  followed  by  real
developments,  the goal of reducing  the contribution to the target level of 14.6  per cent for old-
age  pensions  can be achieved,  without creating deficits.
The pension reform by itself does not guarantee long-term stability of the  pension
system. It lays the ground for better management  of the public pension scheme, however it
needs  to be followed by continuous monitoring of economic and demographic development
in the country. That is why the government of Poland plans to create an office, responsible
for long-term  projections of a social security system (including old-age,  disability and health
care systems).  Existence  of such an office and public discussion of the actuarial  stability of the
social security  would check possible  ad hoc manipulation of the pension system design in the
future. It may be especially  tempting for example  to raise  benefits when reserves  are supposed
to be accumulated,  when the reserve  assets  needed  to sustain the stability of the pay-as-you-go
scheme  will amount to a significant  share of GDP.
56Figure  16. PAYG old-age  fund expenditures  and revenues,  1999-2050 (% GDP)
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586.  Preliminary conclusions and lessons  for other countries
Pension reform in Poland touched almost all aspects of retirement provision, starting
from institutional changes in the  social security administration, through  diversification in
financing of the  future benefits to  shifting the  system from a defined benefit to  defined
contribution  regime.
The most important elements introduced by reform are:
*  reduction of demographic  risk of the finances of the system by introducing defined
contribution regime  in mandatory system;
D  introduction of notional defined contribution first pillar
*  introduction of funded second pillar, managed  by private pension fund managers
D  allowing  market mechanisms  to increase  efficiency  of management
*  introducing strong link between contributions and benefits  and as a result, stronger
incentives  to postpone retirement decision;
*  creating  more  room  for  individual  choice,  both  in  the  accumulation  and
disbursement phase
*  separating  retirement savings  from other parts of the social security system
*  setting a foundation for the further changes  in the social  protection area
As shown  in  the  paper, the  old-age system reform  sets foundations for  long-run
stability of the old-age pension system. It also makes it more immune to  ad hoc political
changes  and debates, by reducing the  necessary  participation of the state budget. The final
outcome includes some transitional regulations  that  reduce the fiscal savings as presented in
initial proposal. Those changes,  however, do not compromise the long-run financial  balance  of
the pay-as-you-go  pillar.
The reform process is not finished, and there are still some components to be put in
place. Those include legislating  the  bridging pensions arrangements for people working in
special  conditions, and the annuities law that establishes  framework for benefit payments in
the second pillar. The new social security system should also be a subject to  long-term
forecasting, in  order to  prevent any changes that could threaten the stability of the social
security system.  Thus, proper actuarial supervision  should be established  and institutionalized.
Also, other elements  of social protection need  to be adjusted  to the new old-age  system.
Those include especially  disability scheme, as in its current shape there is a threat of leakage
from old-age  to disability,  as disability scheme  offers more generous  benefits.
The reformed system started operating on 1  January 1999  and the first pensions will be
paid about ten years from the implementation. It is too early to draw conclusions about the
system performance. However, it is well worth underlining the factors that enabled such a
59fundamental reform to  be put  together and legislated  after a  long period of  fruitless
discussions.
First, the contents of the reform package. There was broad popular support for a
pension  reform that included  a closer  link between  contributions  and benefits  and a greater
role for the private  sector  at the expense  of the social  insurance  institution  (ZUS).
Secondly,  the  leadership. The governments  of prime ministers Cimoszewicz  and
Buzek recognised  the  need for  a  plenipotentiary for pension reform with an  office
independent  from political  influences  and free of the task of day-to-day  management  of the
pension system. The  plenipotentiaries  - Baczkowski,  Hausner and  Lewicka - have
successfully  shielded  the office  for pension  reform from political  fights,  enabling  it to focus  on
its professional  tasks.
Thirdly,  co-operation with trade unions. Security  through  Diversity  was  consistently
supported  by the Solidarity  trade union and OPZZ (at least  until the end of 1997)  and both
were intimately  involved through several  consultations.  Solidarity  had published  its own
reform  proposal  in 1995,  which included  the creation  of mandatory  funded  pillar.
Fourthly,  moving quickly to grasp opportunities.  All three of the plenipotentiaries
understood  the need  to move  quickly  and decisively  to take  advantage  of the public  consensus
behind pension reform, as the  old system became discredited  and the implications  of
demography  became  widely known. Mistakes  can always  be corrected later. It is vital to
remain  ahead  of opponents  to avoid  the reform being  postponed  indefinitely.
The main  conclusion  from Polish  pension  reform  is  that when  an opportunity  presents
itself  it should  be seized.  Politicians  should  foster appropriate  conditions  both for experts  to
design  and implement  the proposal  and  for a broad consultative  process  to foster  support.
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62Appendix
Table  7. Old  and  new  pension  system  characteristics
Old system  New system
Formula  P  = 0.24W  + W*I 0.013:-L  + W I 0.007*S  P=  K/G
W -national  average  wage  for previous  quarter K - pension  capital  of insured,  composed  of
I -individual  wage  index  imputed,  registered  and old-age  contributions
L -total length  of service  G - life  expectancy  coefficient  at pension
S  -additional  years  accepted  for insurance  allotment
benefits
Length  of service  20  for women,  25 for men  Any contributing  period,  but minimum
pension  guarantee  after  20  years  of
______________  _contributing  for women  and 25  for men
Minimum  15  for  women,  20  for men,  without  a right  to  n.a.
length  of service a minimum  pension  guarantee
Qualifying  Employment,  self-employment,  military  Contributing  periods  (employed  and self-
service  service(non  professional),  time  repressed,  employed),  also  unemployment,  maternity,
unemployment  period,  Additional  periods:  taking  care  of disabled  child.  Each  non-
education,  maternity,  taking  care  of disabled  working  period  has  provisions  for
ir  child  contributions  to SIF  from  budget  or elsewhere
:  Additional  Special  multipliers  for miners  and railway  Only  through  third pillar  Employee  Pension
n  credits  workers  Program  arrangement
g  Normal  pension 60  for women,  65  for men  with lot of  Minimum  retirement  age:  60  for women  and
g  age  exclusions.  Average  retirement  age  in 1998  - 65  for men
55  for women  and 59  for men
Early  retirement  Granted  for disabled,  miners,  teachers,  railway  No early  retirement  in the system.  Bridging
workers,  people  working  in special  conditions  pensions  financed  from additional
(list  including  250  different  categories)  - contributions  for people  working  in re-defined
approx.  one quarter  of population  covered.  special  conditions.  Help in retraining  for new
Also  early  retirement  at 55  for women  with at entrants  to the labour  market
________________  least  30  years  of contributing
Credit  for  No special  credit,  only increase  of 0.0013  of  Actuarial  adjustment
_  deferred  pension individual  wage  per each  year  worked
Indexation  of  Since  1996  - at least  prices.  The real  growth  From 1999:  mixed  price-wage  formula,  with
benefits  defined  annually  in the state  budget  law  20%  share  of wages
Taxation  of benefits Taxed  Taxed
Working  pensioners  Allowed  with wage  limitations,  pension  After  reaching  retirement  age  - allowed
recalculated  by adding  extra  contributory  without  limitations.  Pension  recalculated  by
years  to the formula  adding  additional  contributions  divided  by life
expectancy  at the recalculation  moment.  No
funded  pillar participation  after  retirement
Transfer  between  A choice  between  benefits  A choice  between  benefits
disability  and  old-age
benefits
63Old system  New  system
Survivor  pension  Depends  on the number of people eligible  - Depends  on the number of people eligible  -
from 80%  to 90%  of the benefit that a late  from 80% to 90%  of the benefit  that a late
person would have received  or was receiving  person would have  received  or was receiving
(either  disability  or old-age  pension)  (either disability  or old-age  pension).  Pension
split equally between  people eligible  to receive
benefit
Replacement  rates at 76%  Approx. 59%
65 for average
worker
Minimum guarantee Minimum: In nominal terms, indexed  as other  Minimum: In nominal  terms, indexed as other
pensions  for every pensioner that worked for a pensions  for every pensioner  that worked for a
qualifying  period, paid from the Social  qualifying  period, topping  up pension from
Insurance  Fund. In 1998  -approx. 70%  of  first and second  pillar and financed  from the
minimum wage  State Budget.
Maximum  benefit  Maximum:  replacement rate not higher than  No maximum benefit
100%,  individual's  wage factor not higher than
250%  of average  wage
Financing  Paid by employer, not divided  into different  Paid partially by employer  and employee,
risk categories  divided into: old-age,  disability,  sickness  and
work injury contribution, contributions tax
exempt
First  pillar  Mandatory PAYG system - 45% of wage  12.22%  contribution to PAYG old-age  fund,
o  17.07%  - other benefits  (disability,  survivor
and short-term benefits)
Note: Wage  increased  in 1999  by 23% to
______________  ______________________________________  compensate  for the split of contribution
Second  pillar  n.a.  7.3% of wage
Ceiling  and floor Minimum base:  minimum wage  for workers,  Minimum base:  minimum  wage for workers,
levels  60%  of average  wage for self-employed;  60%  of average  wage  for self-employed;
no maximum  Maximum: 250%  of average  wage
Contribution  Social  Security  Institute (ZUS)  ZUS collects  contributions all social  security
collection  purposes, including  2nd pillar
ag PAYG pillar  Social  Security  Institute  Social  Security  Institute
1. Second  pillar  n.a.  Open pension funds and pension fund
>  (accumulation)  managers,  supervised  by State  Supervision
i  ____________  ___________________________________ A  gency
>  Second  pillar  n.a.  Mandatory annuity in one of the private
(benefits)  _  annuity companies
Special  systems  Armed forces  (army, police, border guards,  Farmers, judges,  prosecutors,  armed forces  in
firemen),  farmers,  judges and prosecutors  force prior to January 1, 1999
Third pillar  Mostly life-insurance  combined with  Employee pension programs  in four basic
investment  fund  forms Oive  insurance,  investment fund, mutual
insurance, employee  pension fund).
Contribution up to 7% not covered by social
security tax, but covered  by income tax.
Benefits  not taxed.  Benefits  available  from the
lage  of 60.
64Table 8. Initial reform  proposal  as in Security  through  Diversity  and
its changes  during  the reform  process
Initial  proposal  Final  solution  Consequences
Retirement  62 - 62.  60 for women and 65 for men  Differences  in benefits  between
age  Equal for men and women  men and women, higher
expenditures  and lower revenues
of a pension system
Age groups  Everybody up to 50  Excluding  those who accrue  Medium-term  increase  in
covered  pension rights before the end of  expenditures
_________________  2006
Occupation  Workers,  self-employed,  Judges,  prosecutors and those  Increase  in expenditures  of a
groups covered  judges  and  prosecutors,  who were in force before  state budget (financing  pensions
military forces  up to 30  January 1, 1999  are excluded.  for those remaining  outside  the
(army,  police,  border  Reform covers  those who join  system)
guards,  prison guards,  military  forces after 01/01/99
firemen).
Early  No early retirement  Early retirement for those who  Medium-term  increase  of
retirement  worked 20 or 25 years (depends  expenditures  and reduction  of
on gender)  prior to 1999,  with  revenues
adjustment in benefit formula
(adding  additional rights)
Disability  All disabled  converted  At the retirement age - free  Probably higher expenditures  of
pensions  into old-age  pensioners at  choice  of benefit  disability  fund and lower of
age of 60  pension  fund. Not solved  issue
of 2nd  pillar accumulation
Working  on  Forbidden for fully  Allowed  Increased  incentives  to draw a
disability  disabled  people outside  disability  pension and work on
pensions  labour protected  the same  time, what leads  to
companies  higher  expenditures  of pension
system
Notional  Covered  wage bill growth  75% of covered  wage bill  Initial  proposal imposes  no
accounts  growth  changes  in contribution rate,
indexation  final solution allows  for
reduction  of contribution rate
Benefits  To prices  Mixed  price-wage  with 20%  Increased  expenditures  of
indexation  weight of wages  pension  and disability  funds
Initial capital  Accrued  pension as of 65  Accrued  pension as of 62 years  Higher  implicit debt of the
years of age  of age  pension  system
Pension  K/G for all groups  K/G for all groups, except  Higher  expenditures  of pension
formula  mixed  old-new system formula  system,  smoother transition
for retirees in 2009-2013  between  old and new system
retirees
65Table 9. Medium-term  projections  assumptions
Year  GDPgrowth  Real wage  growth  Employment  |  Real interest rate
growtg
1999  4.80%  5.12%  1.35%  4.50%
2000  5.10%  5.38%  1.15%  3.80%
2001  5.40%  6.19%  0.38%  3.70%
2002  5.70%  6.36%  0.28%  3.50%
2003  5.80%  6.46%  0.38%  3.40%
2004  r  5.60%  5.90%  0.67%  3.40%
2005  5.40%  6.07%  0.19%  3.40%
2006  5.20%  5.61%  0.38%  3.30%
2007  4.90%  5.52%  0.19%  3.30%
2008  4.60%  5.24%  0.19%  3.20%
2009  4.40%  5.15%  0.10%  3.20%
2010  4.20%  4.87%  0.19%  3.20%
2011  4.10%  4.87%  0.10%  3.20%
2012  4.00%  4.78%  0.10%  3.20%
2013  4.00%  4.78%  0.10%  3.20%
2014  3.90%  4.78%  0.00%  3.20%
2015  3.90%  4.78%  0.00%  3.20%
2016  3.90%  4.78%  0.00%  1  3.20%
2017  3.80%  4.78%  e  -0.10%  j  3.20%
2018  1  3.80%  4.78%  -0.10%  I  3.20%
2019  1  3.80%  4.78%  1  -0.10%  3.20%
2020  3.80%  4.78%  -0.10%  3.20%
66Figure 17. IT system design
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67Figure 18. Registration  of employees in ZUS
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+Registration  number  (PESEL  or other)  multi  affiliation.
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OTHER
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68Figure  19.  Registration  of pension  fund  members
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69Figure 20. Contribution  collection  mechanism
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70Figure 21. Individual accounts  identification
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From the information received from  the  banks and Ihe
employers  that doesn't present  errors,  and together  wih the
information  in  is  central database,  it  proceeds  to  identify
individual  employees.
2.  Through  KIR,sends
It performs  the  individualization  process,  identifying:  the  money  to the
+ Employees  with  their  selected  PTEs  and  the amount  of  their  4.2  PTEs
contributions.  *  Informs  each  PTE  through
4 Employees  that  have  not  selected  a PTE  and  the amount  of  their  Transfer  Agents,  the
their  contributions,  amount  of money  that will  be
+ The  payments  with problems  with  information  and  the  transferred  and the  supporting
correspondent  amounts,  individual  infornation.
3.
*  Calculates  the  amounts  to be transferred  to Pension  Funds  PTE's  PTE's
and  the  amounts  to be register  in its own  database.  (Transfer  Agont)  tod  B  k
* Also  calculates  the  amounts  to be  kept  in the  accounts  for  (CUSodan  ank)
employees  that  have  not  selected  a Pension  Fund.
8,  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Verifies  the information  and  the
UNFE  shall  receive  information  from  the PTEs  (Transfer  Q  U  N FE.,~  money  transferred  and  register  the
Agents  and  Cuslodlan  Banks)  on  all transactions  made  with  contributions  In individual  accounts.
ZUS.  This information  should  be  provided  in a standard  format  *  From  this point,  the PTE  should
and as often  as necessary  (every  time the  process  lakes  _  invest  the  money  according  to the
place).  investment  regime.
71Other benefits  financed from the social security  fund
The social security fund (FUS) will establish separate funds for other  benefits paid
from social  security. It includes:
*  Disability fund
e  Fund for sickness (including  maternity leave  and rehabilitation),
e  Fund for work-related illness (including  accidents)
There are also two reserve funds - one for sickness  and disability and the other for work
injury  fund. Having separate reserve funds is related to  planned changes to  work  injury
insurance. According to those, employers will pay contribution related to the probability of
occupational disease or work  injury  in  the sector. Work injury fund will be a subject to
actuarial  adjustment each year.
The rules for disability  benefits were also rationalised.  Disability benefits are granted for
permanent or temporal incapacity to  work (not with relation to  health detriment as it was
before).  If there is any possibility that the individual's  health might improve, then a temporary
benefit will be paid. There are two levels of disability: full and partial incapacity to  work,
based on the  judgement of  a social security doctor, employed by ZUS. Partial  disability
benefit amounts  to  75% of  a  full  benefit. A  pre-pension rehabilitation system was also
established.  Disabled people are allowed to work, regardless  the level of disability, not only in
labour protected workplaces, but also on a regular labour market. Attempts to  change this
rule caused  protests from disabled, who argued that working is a way to rehabilitation and
additionally,  they need salary income to pay for the living expenses. But this solution is still
discussed  in the government.
At  the  moment,  disability expenditures in  Poland exceed 3 per  cent of  GDP, while
disability  pensioners amount to 38 per cent of beneficiaries  of social security system 55. The
social security system allows  for a choice of the benefit  for those who are eligible  to more than
one benefits (e.g. old-age  and disability pension). If this situation was continued, in the future
there could be a significant  leakage  from old-age  to disability.  Thus, the next step in reforming
the welfare  system in Poland is to resolve the issue  of the disability  system".
Also the  area of short-term benefits requires significant changes. Sickness  benefit system
was a source of increasing  deficit. In  1998, the number of sickness days was by 9.7 per cent
higher than in 1997 and 13 per cent higher than in 1996,  of which, number of days financed
by social security  system 57 were 14.5  per cent and 20 per cent respectively. Absenteeism figures
also vary within the groups of insured people. Number of sickness days in 1998 increased by
5 This figure does not take into account that Polish system  allows  to  draw disability  pension also after
retirement  age,  which means  that the real number  of disability  pensioners  in Poland  should  be smaller.
5  Initial  steps  towards  reforming  this element  were  taken  by Polish  government  in 1999.  The reform  proposal  is
planned  to be formulated  in early  2000.
According  to the law,  employers  in Poland  finance  first 35  days  of employee's  sickness  benefit.
728.7 per  cent among employed  and by 15.5 per cent among self-employed. In  mid 1999 Polish
parliament  legislated new sickness  benefit  law, which  introduces  several measures to  lower
sickness spending. Treating  doctors,  who provide sickness certificates will need a registration,
which  can  be  withdrawn  in  case of irregularities.  At  ZUS  the  number  of  social insurance
doctors  will be increase, to ensure better  supervision and screening of sicklisted clients. During
the  initial  period  of  sickness  absence  (obligatory  wage  payment  period),  employers  may
request  medical  re-examinations  by  ZUS  in  case of  doubt  about  the  legitimacy  of work
incapacity.  Some additional  measures are still discussed. For example, introducing  a three day
period,  when worker  does not  need any certificate to proof sickness period (without  a right to
salary).
Polish  government  plan for  1999 also includes preparing  a new proposal  for work  injury
system,  leading  to  diversification  of work  injury  contribution,  based on  the  risk  of work
injury  or occupational sickness in industries.
Short  and  medium-term  financial  projections
The  highest  share in  expenditures  is attributed  to  the  disability  fund  (3 per  cent of
GDP  in 1998). In the future, expenditures  of disability fund should decrease, mostly as a result
of benefit  indexation  principles.  After  2010 disability expenditures  may grow,  as a result of
ageing population  an inflow to disability of post-war baby boom  generation.
With  regards to  short-term  benefits, without  changes, both  sickness and  work-injury
fund  are expected to  have a deficit, each approximately  at the  level of 0.3 per  cent of GDP
annually  (Figure 22). Because those  benefits are based on the  current wages, the  only way to
improve  their  balance is to  either  increase the contribution  rates or to  cut expenditures.  The
first option  may be exercised under  the new work-injury  law, when contribution  rates will be
calculated according to actuarial  principles. The new sickness benefit law is expected to  create
savings at a level of 0.3 per  cent  of GDP,  which will reduce deficit in this  part  of the social
security  system..
Uniformed  services pensions
The  uniformed  services, mainly  the army  and  police,  have a special pension  system
with  completely  different rules. The scheme is non-contributory  and benefits are paid directly
from  the general state budget. The reform covers those, who start their service after January  1,
1999 by including  them in the general system, all those who were in service before keep their
existing  pension  entitlements.  Although  the  uniformed  services do  have  different  pensions
needs,  an entirely  separate system  reduces mobility  between  the uniformed  sector and  other
jobs.  Including  the  uniformed  services in  the universal  system does not  impose  substantial
additional  costs.
73Figure 22. Social insurance system expenditures and revenues,
1999-2020 (% GDP)
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All over  the  world,  pension  systems  have  financing  difficulties  that  need  to  be
addressed.  There  are  three  ways  of  dealing  with  pension  systems  problems  - finance
it to a  greater  extent  from  general  revenues,  rationalise  the  system,  which  produces
savings  in the  short  run,  or a  full-fledged  reform,  changing  the  logic  and  foundations
of  the  system.
After  several  years  of  political  and  professional  discussions,  Poland  decided  to
follow  the  latter  path  and  introduced  a  new  defined  contribution  mulitipillar  system,
consisting  of  a public  Notional  Defined  Contribution,  pay-as-you-go  first  pillar,  a
funded  private  second  pillar,  and  voluntary  funded  third  pillar.  The  new  framework
covers  only  retirement  savings,  while  other  benefits  still  remain  under  the  old  defined-
benefit  pay-as-you-go  regime.  The  reform  was  launched  on January  1,  1999.  As  of
this  date,  the  old  defined  benefit  pay-as-you-go  system  was  terminated  for  workers
younger  than  50.  The  new  old-age  system  attempts  to offer  actuarially  fair  benefits,
potentially  creating  incentives  to increase  compliance  and  postpone  retirement.
Minimum  benefit  provision  for  those  who  fall below  the guaranteed  level  is  co-
financed  from  general  revenue.  Diversification  of  retirement  savings  provides  greater
security  to  the  members,  as  labour  market  developments  that  determine  the  notional
rate  of return  in the  first  pillar,  and  financial  market  developments  that  determine
the  second  pillar  rate  of return  are  not perfectly  correlated.  This  is  why  the reform
package  has  been  named  Security  through  Diversity.
This  paper  presents  the  current  situation  of  the  pension  system,  the  struggle  for
pension  reform  in the  1  990s,  structure,  the long-term  outlook  of  the  new  pension
system  and  the main  aspects  of the  system  design  as  well  as  first  experiences  from
the  implementation  process.  Long-term  projections  show  that  the  new  system  allows
for  greater  financial  stability  of  the  public  pension  scheme  and  increases  the  savings
rate  with a positive  impact  on  economic  growth.
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